Cosmological argument
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The cosmological argument is an argument for the existence of God, traditionally known as an "argument from universal causation," an "argument from first cause," and also as the "uncaused cause" argument. Whichever term is used, there are three basic variants of this argument, each with subtle but important distinctions: the argument from causation in esse, the argument from causation in fieri, and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument does not attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist. This cause is known in latin as "causa sui."
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[edit] Origins of the argument
Plato and Aristotle both posited first cause arguments, though each with certain notable caveats. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BCE) posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work Timaeus. For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ex nihilo or out of nothing. The demiurge was only able to organize the "anake." The anake was the only other co-existent element or presence in Plato's cosmogony.
Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE) also put forth the idea of a creator of the cosmos, often referred to as the "Prime Mover" in his work Metaphysics. For Aristotle too, as for Plato, the underlying "stuff" of the universe always was in existence and always would be (which in turn follows Parmenides' famous statement that "nothing can come from nothing"). Aristotle posited an underlying ousia (an essence or substance) of which the universe is composed, and it is the ousia which the Prime Mover organized and set into motion.
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274 CE), probably the best known theologian of the Middle Ages, adapted the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle to form one of the earliest and the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of first cause is the idea that the universe must have been caused by something which was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God.
Countless other philosophers and theologians have posited first-cause arguments both before and since Aquinas. The versions sampled in the following sections are representative of the most common derivations of the argument.
[edit] The argument
Framed as an informal proof, the first cause argument can be stated as follows:
- Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
- Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
- A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
- Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be something which is not an effect.
The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about the entire universe, unless the "first cause" is taken to mean the same thing as "God." Thus, the argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. In other words, the existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe—generally assumed to be God—is that explanation.
In light of the Big Bang theory, a stylized version of cosmological argument for the existence of God has emerged (sometimes called the Kalam cosmological argument, the following form of which was put forth by William Lane Craig):
- Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
- The universe began to exist.
- Therefore, the universe had a cause.
[edit] A more detailed discussion of the argument
A basic explanation might go something like this: Consider some event in the universe. Whatever event you choose, it will be the result of some cause, or more likely a very complex set of causes. Each of those causes would be the result of some other set of causes, which are in turn a result of yet other causes. Thus there is an enormous chain of events in the universe, with the earlier events causing the later events. And either this chain of events has a beginning, or it does not.
Currently, the theory of the cosmological history of the universe most widely accepted by astronomers and astrophysicists includes an apparent first event—the Big Bang—the expansion of all known matter and energy from a superdense, singular point at some finite time in the past. Though contemporary versions of the cosmological argument most typically assume that there was a beginning to the cosmic chain of physical, or natural causes, the early formulations of the argument did not have the benefit of this degree of theoretical insight into the apparent origins of the cosmos.
Plato's demiurge and Aristotle's Prime Mover each referred to a being who, they speculated, set in motion an already existing "stuff" of the cosmos. A millennium and a half later, Aquinas went on to argue that there is an Uncaused Cause which is just another name for God. And to Aquinas, it remained logically possible that the universe has already existed for an infinite amount of time, and will continue to exist for an infinite amount of time. In his classic Summa Theologiae, he posited that even if the universe has always existed, (a notion which he rejected on other grounds), there is still the question of cause, or even of "first cause."
[edit] The argument from contingency
Aquinas also used an argument from contingency (Summa Theol. I,2,3), which is distinct from the first cause argument. He observed that in nature there are things whose existence is contingent, that is, possible for it to be and not to be. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which such things did not in fact exist. Thus, on probabilistic grounds, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If that is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Thus contingent beings are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings, meaning there must exist a Necessary Being for which it is impossible not to exist, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is derived.
The argument relies on a sort of modal, probabilistic logic to argue there must have been a time when no contingent beings existed. It also relies on the belief that it is impossible for things to come into being if absolutely nothing was existentially prior, which is the assumption of causality or rationality. It should be noted that the concept of an ontologically necessary being is distinct from that of logical necessity in mathematical or sentential logic.
The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz made a somewhat similar argument with his Principle of sufficient reason in 1714. He wrote: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason...is found in a substance which...is a necessary Being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."
[edit] "In esse" and "in fieri"
The difference between the arguments from causation in fieri and in esse is a fairly important one. In fieri is generally translated as "becoming," while in esse is generally translated as "in existence." In fieri, the process of becoming, is similar to building a house. Once it is built, the builder walks away and it stands of its own accord. (It may require occasional maintenance, but that is beyond the scope of the "first cause" argument.)
In esse (in existence) is more akin to the light from a candle or the liquid in a vessel. George Hayward Joyce, SJ, explains that "...where the light of the candle is dependent on the candle's continued existence, not only does a candle produce light in a room in the first instance, but its continued presence is necessary if the illumination is to continue. If it is removed, the light ceases. Again, a liquid receives its shape from the vessel in which it is contained; but were the pressure of the containing sides withdrawn, it would not retain its form for an instant." This form of the argument is far more difficult to separate from a purely "first-cause" argument than is the example of the house's maintenance above, because here the "first cause" is insufficient without the candle's or vessel's continued existence.
Thus, Aristotle's argument is in fieri, while Aquinas' argument is both in fieri and in esse (plus an additional argument from contingency). The distinction is an excellent example of the difference between a deistic view (Aristotle) and a theistic view (Aquinas). Leibnitz, who wrote more than two centuries before the "big bang" was taken as granted, is arguing in esse. As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument including the Kalam argument, tend to lean very strongly towards an in fieri argument.
[edit] Counterarguments and objections
Several objections to the cosmological argument have been raised. One very simple objection is that, in the formulation above, the conclusion (4) There must be a first cause (which itself does not have a cause) leaves open the question of why the First Cause should not require a cause. Though this is not an intrinsic self-contradiction with the assumption (1) that every effect should have a cause, since not everything is necessarily an effect, it may be argued, not without controversy, that an infinite regression of causes is in fact possible.
Another objection is that even if one accepts the argument as a proof of a First Cause, it does not identify this first cause with "God" in the theistic sense. The argument does not ascribe to this First Cause some of the basic attributes commonly associated with "God," such as self-awareness and will (though there are some theists who actually do make such attempts when using this argument [1]). It simply names the First Cause as "God" without proving that it has all the characteristics that that name usually implies. At best, the argument demonstrates the necessity of a "supernatural" first cause, without showing any particular attributes of that cause, save perhaps that it is eternal and existentially perfect. Furthermore, the argument only requires God as a first cause, but need not require that God continue to interact with the universe beyond that purpose; in other words, it does not prove a provident God. Some deists have agreed that the argument proves that God created the universe, but maintained nevertheless that God then ceased to interact with the material universe.
Opponents also point to the semantic difficulty that the cosmological argument seems to apply temporal concepts to situations where time does not exist. For example, in physics, "cause" is a temporal concept that requires time; things which exist outside of time do not have to be caused. Since time is merely a property of the universe, the laws of time (i.e. cause) are not applicable to the universe considered as a whole. Similarly, time can begin, but not require a cause, since all human concepts of a caused beginning have something before that beginning (including the cause); this is not true of time itself. This class of counterargument assumes that causality is necessarily temporal, which itself is a point of dispute.
Defenders of cosmological arguments that do not assume the finite age of the universe argue that the eternal existence of the universe would not eliminate the problem of origin. On a similar note, one could also claim that the universe has always existed and its "creation" is thus not causal in nature, so no "first cause" is necessary. If one believes that time is infinite and that causality must be temporal, then there would be no need for a "first cause" of any sort. However, it is not yet certain whether physics supports or disproves an eternal universe - some scientific models continue to suggest a eternal, cyclical, or oscillatory universe rather than a single creation event. The question of the nature of time has not been resolved by modern physics, being treated differently by quantum mechanics and relativity, thus its implications for how the visible universe originated must remain an open issue.
Gottfried Leibniz stated the problem in his conclusion, although his terminology included some assumptions. If his principle of sufficient reason is indeed universally applicable, then the First Thing must either (1) be its own cause or (2) have a non-causal explanation. The non-causal explanation would either (a) make the First Thing's existence be in some way self-explanatory or (b) make it follow in an explanatory way from self-explanatory truths, such as the truths of logic.
All three options have had defenders. Thus, option (1), the causa sui option, is defended by Descartes. Option (2a) is held by some of those like Aquinas who think that God's essence is identical with God's existence, or by those who hold, more weakly, that God's existence follows from his essence. Option (2b) essentially holds that there is a sound ontological argument for the existence of God, although we may not have discovered it yet. It follows from the principle of sufficient reason that one of the three options holds, but a defender of the Principle does not need to give an independent proof of any one of these options. It is, after all, the conclusion of the argument that one of these holds. In fact, this conclusion might be the starting point for responding to the problem of identifying the First Thing with God--that is how it is in Aquinas, for instance. Thus, if one could show the premises of the cosmological argument to be true and show that options (1) and (2a) were not tenable, then the cosmological argument would turn into an argument for the existence of an ontological argument. We would then know that there is a sound ontological argument, even if we did not know what it is.
Alternately, the defender of the cosmological argument can restrict the principle of sufficient reason in such a way that it does not require us to give an explanation of the existence of the First Thing. One such restriction would be to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of contingent facts. Another is to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of explainable facts. These restrictions would require arguments, respectively, that the universe is contingent or that the universe's existence is explicable.
If the principle of sufficient reason does not hold, then the "selection" among potential alternatives must be random or a "brute fact". Defenders of the Principle will insist that neither option really makes sense.
[edit] Criticisms of counterarguments
To evaluate arguments/objections, it is necessary to consider the following:
1. The cosmological argument as held by Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides and Averroes does not concern itself with a "first cause" that starts at the beginning of time.
2. The cosmological argument is posited on the assumption that everything in the experience of our five physical senses is natural and that everything natural is caused, contingent and dependent - subject to cause by the uncaused cause.
That includes time. Time is understood as "natural" in substance, while the uncaused cause is not natural and therefore not operable in time. i.e.: Aristotle, who first formulated the argument, believed the natural, caused universe was infinite, without beginning. Aquinas, who re-formulated the argument as a proof for monotheism, understood the Divine as outside of time, viewing all of time, indeed being present in all of time, simultaneously like a vast simulcrum
3. Criticisms of this argument should be divided into those that criticize the essence of the dualistic argument: that the universe has a cause that is different in substance from the natural universe, versus those that criticize the monotheistic extension of the argument that the cause of the universe is God (as asserted by Maimonides, Aquinas and Averroes).
The Aristotelian formulation of the argument held that the universe is of an essence or substance such that all things in the universe are caused: dependent and contingent. He postulated an alternative essence or substance that does not have the qualities of dependency or contingency and which, therefore, does not require a cause, but which itself may be the source upon which our natural, caused universe, is dependent, or contingent.
Laying aside that Aristotle believed the universe to be infinite in nature, stated in its original formulation as such, this is not saying a very different thing from modern, naturalistic cosmology. When we look for the origin of the universe we effectively postulate "substances", forces or circumstances that are "pre-natural". Consider some of the varieties of physical, cosmological expanations for the origin of the universe: (a) understanding that time itself is part of the natural order, we cannot say "before" time, but we say that at the instant of the big bang, conditions that do not exist under present day manifestations of physical laws caused an inflationary expansion of space or (b) "branes", moving through imperceptible dimensions stretch in opposing directions until they turn back on themselves, eventually colliding and causing new universes to come into being.
In either case, though the "cause" is not supernatural as the monotheistic form of the cosmological argument suggests, it is, nonetheless, "specialized" and yields to a form of naturalistic dualism (present-day natural conditions versus past natural conditions). Monotheistic innovations of the argument distinguish themselves by postulating that the dualism is supernatural and that whatever the "uncaused cause", it is the Divine.
Almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that is effectively dualistic in nature and basically reflective of the Aristotlean reasoning underlying the original cosmological argument - they simply do so without making the jump to assume any spiritually supernatural qualities of a universe's dual source. This is not special pleading as some have said, as special pleading applies to the same claiming to be different, not to the different, in fact, being different. On careful consideration of the big bang, for example, some sort of dualistic "cause", itself presumably not caused, or at least not caused by the "natural" forces manifest by current conditions in our universe, appears prima facie to be inescapable.
Understood as such, where the inherent dualism of the cosmological argument forces neither a naturalist (uncaused cause was not Divine) or supernaturalist (uncaused cause was Divine) conclusion, it is possible to formulate versions of the cosmological argument that lend to an atheistic conclusion. <ref>For an example see Smith, Quentin. "A Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God's Nonexistence" FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY in April 1992 (Volume 9, No. 2, pp. 217-237).</ref>
[edit] Scientific positions
Modern quantum physics is sometimes interpreted to deny the validity of the first premise of the cosmological argument (that everything has a cause), showing that subatomic particles such as electrons, positrons, and photons, can come into existence, and perish, by virtue of spontaneous energy fluctuations in a vacuum. Though such occurrences do not violate the Law of Conservation of Mass and Energy, Bell's theorem shows that these are impossible to predict.
Modern physical cosmology is neutral on truth of the second premise (that the universe "began" to exist and is not a result of infinite regression of causes), asserting that while spacetime as observed tends toward a singularity giving the universe an observed finite age, this does not discount the possibility that the stochastic processes that govern the early evolution of the universe actually cause the universe to be eternal. In particular, the lack of a consistent theory of quantum gravity has meant that there is no physical theory and no meaningful prediction can be made about what character the universe had before the Planck time. Indeed the supposed singularity from which the universe is said to have originated in the classic Big Bang picture is actually a physical paradox - an indication that current theory is not an adequate description. This era of the universe and its associated energy regime remains one of the unsolved problems in physics and as such does not lend itself either to the existence of a "first cause" or lack thereof.
Recently, newer, speculative theories have been offered by a number of theorists, but there is no scientific consensus as of yet on whether the universe necessarily began to exist or whether it is eternal (for example, "big bang," expansion of cosmos, then contraction, then "big crunch," then a "big bang" again, once every 30 or 40 billion years ad infinitum).
A commonly stated workaround for the cosmological argument is the nature of time. The Big Bang is said to be the start of both space and time, so the question "What was there before the universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time. This has been put forward by Stephen Hawking, who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole (however, this comment was made in reference to cosmology and not theology).
[edit] Islamic view
The Islamic variant developed by Averroes.
[edit] Notes and references
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[edit] See also
- Biblical cosmology
- Cosmogony
- Creator god
- Aristotle
- Aquinas
- Maimonides
- Averroes
- Creationism
- Creation (theology)
- Dating Creation
- Day-Age Creationism
- Evolutionary Creationism
- Existence
- Existence of God
- Gap Creationism
- Infinitism
- Intelligent design
- Old Earth Creationism
- Origin belief
- Teleological argument
- Theism
- Timeline of the Big Bang
- Young Earth Creationism
