Dihairesis
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According to Epictetus, Dihairesis is the second-power Judgement, or Superjudgement, capable of distinguishing, among ordinary judgements about any situation, what is subject to our exclusive power and what is not subject to our exclusive power. The following are some of the many illustrative examples of Dihairesis found in the ‘Discourses’ of Epictetus: A) ‘Today I must surely die. Must I groan too?’ B) ‘Tomorrow I must be fettered. Must I moan too?’ C) ‘I have been condemned to exile. Does anyone prevent me from being serene?’ A Prohairesis that assumes an attitude in accordance with Dihairesis will, in case A, die and not groan, in case B not moan when the body is fettered, in case C accept exile with serenity. Dihairesis is the Superjudgement in exact opposition to Counterdihairesis.
