Erich von Manstein
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Erich von Manstein (November 24, 1887–June 10 1973) was a lifelong professional soldier who rose to become one of the most prominent commanders of Nazi Germany's armed forces (Wehrmacht) during World War II; he attained the rank of Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall), although he was never a member of the Nazi Party.
Von Manstein came up with the idea which evolved into the Sichelschnitt ('Sickle Cut') plan for the conquest of France; later, he was commander of armies in the Crimea and at Leningrad before taking charge of Army Group South. In this post, von Manstein brought about one of the greatest victories in modern warfare when, despite the numerical and material superiority of the Soviets, he was able to halt the Red Army’s offensive fresh from the victory at Stalingrad and went on to capture the city of Kharkov with his own successful counteroffensive.
Though he never questioned Hitler's final authority as commander-in-chief of the German Army, he was famous for repeatedly standing up to Hitler on various issues, often with the rest of the General Staff watching. Although this would have normally led to his swift removal, von Manstein was one of the very few generals who had repeatedly proved themselves in Hitler's eyes. Eventually, his differences with Hitler over matters of strategy led to his being dismissed in 1944.
In 1949, a British military tribunal sentenced him to 18 years imprisonment for war crimes, but he was released after only four years for medical reasons. He subsequently served as a senior adviser to the West German government, helping to shape the new Bundeswehr and was its honorary chief of staff.
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[edit] Early life
Von Manstein was born Fritz Erich von Lewinski in Berlin, the tenth child of a Prussian aristocrat, artillery general Eduard von Lewinski (1829–1906), and Helene von Sperling (1847–1910). Hedwig von Sperling (1852–1925), Helene's younger sister, was married to Lieutenant General Georg von Manstein (1844–1913). The couple were not able to have children, so it was decided that the unborn child would be adopted by his uncle and aunt. When he was born, the Lewinskis sent a telegram to the von Mansteins which stated: You got a healthy boy today. Mother and child well. Congratulations. (von Manstein, E.: Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert, 5th Ed., 2002, p. 10).
Not only were Erich von Manstein's "fathers" Prussian Generals, both his grandfathers had also been Prussian Generals (one of them leading a corps in the Franco–Prussian War of 1870–71), as was his mother's brother; he was also closely related to Paul von Hindenburg, the future Generalfeldmarschall and President of Germany. Thus his career in the Prussian army was assured from birth. It was said that von Manstein also had Jewish ancestry.[citation needed] He attended the Lycée in Strasbourg (1894–99), which had become part of the German Empire after the war of 1870–71. He then spent six years in the cadet corps (1900–1906) in Plön and Groß-Lichterfelde. Von Manstein joined the Third Foot Guards Regiment (Garde zu Fuß) in March 1906 as an ensign. He was promoted to Lieutenant in January 1907. In October 1913, he entered the War Academy.
[edit] Middle years
[edit] World War I
During World War I, he served both on the German Western Front (Belgium/France 1916: Attack on Verdun, 1917–18: Champagne) and the Eastern Front (1915: North Poland, 1915–16: Serbia, 1917: Estonia). In Poland, he was severely wounded in November 1914, returned to duty in 1915, promoted to captain and remained as a staff officer until the end of the war. In 1918, he volunteered for the staff position in the Frontier Defense Force in Breslau (Wroclaw) and served there until 1919.
[edit] Inter-war era
He married Jutta Sibylle von Loesch in 1920, the daughter of a Silesian landowner; the relationship would last until her death in 1966. They had three children: a daughter named Gisela, and two sons, Gero (b. December 31, 1922) and Rüdiger. Their elder son Gero died on the battlefield in the northern sector of the Eastern Front on October 29, 1942.
He stayed in the military after the war, and in the 1920s, von Manstein took part in the creation of the Reichswehr, the German Army of the Weimar Republic (restricted to 100,000 men by the Versailles Treaty). He was promoted to company commander in 1920, and battalion commander in 1922. In 1927, he was promoted to Major, and started serving with the General Staff, visiting other countries to learn about their military. In 1933, the Nazi party rose to power in Germany, ending the Weimar era. The new regime renounced the Versailles Treaty and proceeded with large scale rearmament and expansion of the military.
On July 1, 1935, he was made the Head of Operations Branch of the Army General Staff (Generalstabs des Heeres), part of the Army High Command (OKH). During his tenure, he proposed the development of Sturmgeschütz, self-propelled assault guns that would provide heavy direct-fire support to infantry, relieving the mobile tank forces of this responsibility. In World War II, the resulting StuG series would prove to be one of the most successful and cost-effective German weapons.
He was promoted on October 1, 1936, becoming the Deputy Chief of Staff (Oberquartermeister I ) to the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Ludwig Beck. Von Manstein initially supported Beck in resistance to the encroaching political influence of the Nazi Party in the army, at one point going so far as to issue a memorandum calling for an end to racial indoctrination in the army, but he soon changed tack. This led Beck to sardonically dismiss von Manstein as "not a man of bad character but a man of no character at all", a condemnation von Manstein would repeatedly justify. Thereafter, von Manstein maintained that the OKH should refrain from interceding in political matters and even in matters of higher strategy, claiming that these were Hitler's responsibility. The General Staff's task, he argued, was to produce the operational planning necessary to realize the dictator's goals and no more. Beck was inevitably sickened by this, and effectively severed relations with von Manstein. On February 4 1938 von Manstein was appointed commander of the 18th Infantry Division in Liegnitz, Silesia with the rank of Generalleutnant.
[edit] World War II
[edit] Poland
On August 18, 1939, in preparation for Operation Fall Weiß, the German invasion of Poland, he was appointed the Chief of Staff to Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Here he worked along with von Rundstedt’s Chief of Operations, Colonel Günther Blumentritt developing the operational plan. Von Rundstedt accepted von Manstein’s plan that called for the concentration of the majority of Army Group’s armored units into Walther von Reichenau’s 10th Army with the objective of a decisive breakthrough leading to the encirclement of Polish forces west of the River Vistula. In von Manstein’s plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South, Wilhelm List’s 14th Army and Johannes Blaskowitz’s 8th Army were to provide the flank support for Reichenau’s armored thrust towards Warsaw, the Polish capital. Privately, von Manstein was lukewarm about the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep Poland as a buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union; he was also worried about an Allied attack on the West Wall once the Polish campaign started, thus drawing Germany into a two-front war.
Launched on September 1, the invasion started successfully. In Army Group South’s area of responsibility, armored units of the 10th Army pursued the retreating Poles, giving them no time to set up a defense, while the 8th Army on its flanks prevented the unconnected Polish troop concentrations in Łódź, Radom and Poznań from merging into a more coherent force. Deviating from the original plan that called for heading straight for the Vistula and then proceeding to Warsaw, von Manstein persuaded von Rundstedt to encircle the Polish units in the Radom area. This succeeded, clearing the bulk of Polish resistance from the southern approach to Warsaw.
[edit] France
On September 27, Poland formally surrendered, although isolated pockets of resistance remained. That same day, Hitler ordered the Army High Command, led by General Franz Halder, to develop the plan for action in the west against France and the Low Countries. The different plans that the General Staff suggested were given to von Manstein and Gerd von Rundstedt and they finalized the plan of Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). This plan got Hitler's attention and finally his agreement.
By late October, the bulk of the German Army was redeployed to the west. Von Manstein was made Chief of Staff of von Rundstedt’s Army Group A in western Germany. Like many of the Army's younger officers, von Manstein opposed Fall Gelb, criticizing it for its lack of creativity and the improper utilization of the armored forces, coming from OKH's lack of understanding of the new mobile concepts of warfare, principally the blitzkrieg concepts of Heinz Guderian, Germany's foremost armored warfare expert. Von Manstein also pointed out that a rehash of the Schlieffen Plan with the attack through Belgium was something the Allies expected, as they were already moving strong forces into the area; he also opposed the timetable, arguing that fighting in the spring, instead of November or the winter months, would be far more suitable and advantageous for the German Army.
Von Manstein developed his own plan: he suggested that the panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes where no one would expect them, then seize bridges on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel before redeploying and striking eastward. Thus outflanking the Maginot Line, cutting off from the French mainland strong French and Allied Armies in Belgium and Flanders. The plan was nicknamed Sichelschnitt (sickle cut).
OKW originally rejected the proposal. Halder had von Manstein removed from von Rundstedt's headquarters and sent away to command the 38th Army Corps. But Hitler, looking for innovative new methods of waging war, approved a modified version of von Manstein's ideas, that later became known as the Manstein Plan. Von Manstein and his Corps played a minor role during the operations in France, serving under Günther von Kluge's 4th Army. However, it was his Corps which helped to achieve the first breakthrough, east of Amiens, and was the first to reach and cross the River Seine. The invasion was an outstanding military success and von Manstein was promoted to General and awarded the Knight's Cross for suggesting the plan.
[edit] Barbarossa
In February 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps. He was involved in Operation Barbarossa, in which he served under General Erich Hoepner. Attacking on June 22, 1941, von Manstein advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and was able to seize two vital bridges over the Dvina River at Dvinsk. The following month he captured Demyansk and Torzhok.
[edit] Crimea
In September 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of 11th Army. Its former commander, Colonel-General Ritter von Schobert, had been killed when his plane landed in a Russian minefield. Initially, the 11th Army was tasked with invading the Crimea, and then the pursuit to Rostov to minimize the threat against the flank of Army Group South, during its advance into Russia. Hitler also intended to use the Kerch peninsula to land forces in the Caucasus. This, however, would turn out to be tougher than anticipated.
The 11th Army order of battle included two Corps: 30th Corps, comprised of 22nd, 72nd, and 170th Infantry Divisions, and 54th Corps, consisting of 46th, 73rd, and 50th Infantry Divisions. The latter Corps had been in charge of the advance into the Crimean peninsula earlier in September. Along with the two Corps, 11th Army was reinforced with 42nd Corps HQ, and the 132nd and 24th Infantry Divisions. Elements of the Romanian 3rd Army were also under von Manstein's command. Though Soviet forces in the Crimea totaled 235,600 men[citation needed], only around 50,000 were deployed in the Isthmus of Perekop, which connects the Crimean peninsula to the mainland.[citation needed] This was problematic for the Soviets but would in the end enable a large number of Russian troops to avoid capture after the isthmus was taken by the Germans. Of great benefit to the Germans was that shortly before the German attack, Stalin insisted upon an attack from the isthmus. This attack inevitably[citation needed] failed, costing the Soviet forces there heavy losses and disrupting work on fortifications.
The assault began on October 18, 1941, going through the narrow and desolate isthmus area. A furious ten-day struggle followed, with the Russians displaying determined resistance. Despite the soggy terrain, by October 28 the Soviet defense collapsed and the Crimea looked ripe for the plucking.
The 11th Army entered the Crimea with all available forces. Despite heavy losses, both Corps were in full pursuit of the retreating enemy. Von Manstein would later claim that half the Russian force (total 200,000 men) were captured along with 700 guns and 160 tanks, in truth Soviet losses of all kind totaled 63,800 men.[citation needed] Even by the Wehrmacht's lax standards of accuracy in reporting enemy losses, von Manstein's figures were grossly inflated.[citation needed] This would cause many a headache for the Germans later on, since exaggerating Soviet losses resulted in underestimating the Soviets' remaining strength, which led to one shocking surprise after another.[citation needed] By November 16, only the fortress of Sevastopol remained under Russian control. In the meantime, the city was reinforced by sea, receiving the bulk of the Russian troops evacuated from Odessa. An attack beginning as early as on October 30 soon intensified into an all-out effort. It was repelled, primarily because von Manstein decided to attack the enclave's southern flank, counting on its seemingly poorer fortifications. He thus learned the hard way that the Soviets were correct to distribute the enclave's fortifications as they did, for the terrain in the south was prohibitively difficult. On December 4 the local Soviet command reported that the defences had been restabilised. Von Manstein therefore abandoned the attack in the south, transferred his forces to the north and attacked there. By then it was December 17 and the autumn fog had thickened enough to provide the Soviets with the cover from the Luftwaffe necessary to reinforce the enclave. On December 21, just as the Germans, now less than two kilometres from Severnaia Bay, prepared for their final push, the Soviets launched a counter attack hurling them back. The second storming attempt had also failed. Soon the Soviet winter offensive began, producing the Wehrmacht's so-called "Winter Crisis."
Just over a week later, on December 26, the Soviets landed on the Kerch straits, and on December 30 executed another landing near Theodosia, in all landing 41,930 troops. These would be quickly reinforced. This was an attempt to regain the initiative in the Crimea, and relieve the pressure against Sevastopol, which von Manstein was about to charge again despite the unclement weather. The initial success however, soon emboldened the Soviets to envisage a drive to the Isthmus of Perekop.
The only Axis reserves were an infantry division under Sponeck's command, and a Romanian mountain regiment. Conducting a fighting retreat, the German division lost most of its heavy equipment, and the Red Army advanced all the way to the Theodosia line before a front could be established. A series of attacks and counterattacks followed, with the last Soviet attack on April 9, 1942. Six divisions and 160 tanks tried to push back the Germans, failing completely after two days.
Then 11th Army launched a counterattack of its own, code named "Operation Bustard", aimed at expelling the Russian forces in the Kerch area and resuming the offensive on Sevastopol. Opposing the German forces were 17 rifle (infantry) divisions, along with several independent brigades. The Germans had 7 infantry divisions and a panzer division. About one third of their forces were Romanian. "Operation Bustard" began on May 8 and would continue for ten days. After a number of feints in the north, the 11th Army broke through in the south, pursuing the enemy up to the Kerch straits. It was claimed by von Manstein that the combination of air and artillery fire held at bay Soviet boats seeking to evacuate the Soviet troops marooned there, and that 173,000 Soviet POWs were captured, in addition to some 100,000 killed.[citation needed] In reality, it took some time to regroup the artillery, while the Luftwaffe proved useless for nocturnal interdiction purposes, (as would soon be demonstrated in Stalingrad, against the Soviet cross-Volga ferry service, to far graver effect). As a result, the Soviet forces that made it to the straits were mostly evacuated. Soviet missing and dead totaled 162,282 (including those who died during hospitalisation, after evacuation). Catastrophic losses to be sure, but far lower than von Manstein's claims.[citation needed]
[edit] The Capture of Sevastopol
To help with the siege, von Manstein had at his disposal some of the largest guns ever built. Along with large numbers of regular artillery pieces, super-heavy 600mm mortars and the 800mm "Dora" railway gun were brought in for the assault. However, the famous Dora gun was hopelessly inaccurate and proved to be a logistic liability rather than an artillery asset, useful only for propaganda purposes. The furious barrage began on the morning of June 7, and all of the resources of the Luftwaffe, commanded by von Richthofen, descended on their targets, proceeding for five days before the charge began.
Von Manstein's plan erroneously postulated that the Severnaia Bay ports constituted a logistic lifeline whose severance would topple the Sevastopol enclave without the Germans having to batter down every inch of it. Since a southward attack from the extreme right sector offered the path of least resistance to the bay, von Manstein decided to commit his main effort there with the 54th Corps, which possessed five divisions beforehand and would receive yet another during the attack. An additional east-to-west holding attack would be delivered by the 30th Corps—comprising three divisions—against the enclave's southern sector to prevent the Soviets from transferring forces across Severnaia Bay to reinforce their northern flank. Each German Corps was supported by a much smaller Romanian Corps. This plan surprisingly disregarded the fact that substantial Soviet supply deliveries to the enclave could not resume, in any event, before autumn returned to fog out the Luftwaffe and that knowing this, the Soviets had hoarded considerable supplies in advance, as they were not able to do before the attacks on the enclave in 1941. Neither Severnaia Bay nor the enclave's entire shoreline still constituted the sought-after lifeline. There was no alternative to battering down the entire enclave, were it to be captured.
The outer defensive rings were breached by June 16, and the 54th Corps soon seized most of the bay's northern shore, yet strong Soviet pockets held fast on its flanks and even in its rear, while the 30th Corps' westward attack ground to a halt before the Soviet defensive system's bulwark, the so called "Sapun Line", beginning almost exactly south of the bay's crown. It emerged that von Manstein's plan had overestimated the effect that incapacitating the Severnaia Bay ports would have on the defenders which, predictably, proved none at all. On the night of June 28 von Manstein launched an amphibious crossing of the bay, aiming to outflank the troublesome Sapun Line. This was a foolhardy and extremely costly quick fix for which the available German flotilla was hopelessly unsuited, while German aviation and artillery, despite all of their efforts, could do little against the deep subterranean Soviet coastal defences. The Germans attacked ferociously, but the Soviet defenders managed to hang on until nightfall, whereupon they could be reinforced. Despite all of this, von Manstein continued to feed troops into what were obviously death trap "beachheads".
Success however, materialized elsewhere. On the Sapun Line's northern end, forces of the 30th Corps—reinforced with the part of the 54th Corps which von Manstein had decided to land on that tiny stretch of Severnaia's southern shore already captured by the 30th Corps—managed to breach the defences. On the line's southern end, having feigned against the center, German and Romanian troops managed to force the Soviet defences. Though it was breached at both ends, the Soviets might have tried to hang on to the Sapun Line but they had run out of shells. The Soviet commander, Petrov, accordingly ordered a withdrawal west to Cape Khersones, where more supplies awaited his men, and where he intended to make his last stand. The exhausted German forces were unable to immediately pursue and thus preempt this Soviet reformation. Von Manstein launched a massive bombardment of the city of Sevastopol, ostensibly in order to suppress the defences, though these (with the exception of one stronghold near the shore) were left unmanned, since Petrov had naively hoped he could thus spare the city annihilation. After some more furious fighting, Khersones too fell to Germans on July 4. Hitler, delighted at hearing the good news, phoned von Manstein and commended him as "The Conqueror of Sevastopol", informing him that he had ordered his promotion to Generalfeldmarschall.
The fighting in the officially conquered enclave was, nevertheless, far from over. There remained a cluster of Soviet pockets that had to be smothered. The ensuing "mopping up" raged on until late autumn, claiming many more Axis lives. Von Manstein claimed over 90,000 Red Army soldiers taken prisoner, and an even greater number killed.[citation needed] However the Soviet garrison defending Sevastopol totaled 106,000 men beforehand, and received only 3,000 in reinforcements during the attack, while it is known that 25,157 persons were evacuated, the overwhelming majority being either wounded soldiers or officers evacuated on Stalin's orders. It is also evident from Soviet accounts that very few Soviet troops survived the German onslaught; von Manstein himself records that the Soviets prefered to blow themselves up along with the German soldiers closing in on their positions rather than surrender, behaviour he ascribes to the ruthlessness of the "commissars" and to the basic "contempt for human life of this Asiatic power" rather than Soviet knowledge of the Wehrmacht's murderous treatment of Soviet POWs.[citation needed] The few who did surrender were promptly murdered at von Manstein's insistence by Einzatsgruppe D, though its commander Otto Ohlendorf was opposed to the indiscriminate slaughter of non-Jews. Von Manstein put his own losses at an impossibly low 24,000. This figure excludes all Romanian losses, though the Romanians fought well and hard in Sevastopol, rendering an indispensable contribution to the victory. It also excludes all German losses sustained during the "mopping up" fighting after the capture of Cape Khersones, as well as all prior German losses lighter than fatalities and invalidities. The fall of Sevastopol resulted in von Manstein's promotion to Generalfeldmarschall, as promised. Hitler and others were deeply impressed by what they perceived as his hardness.[citation needed]
[edit] Leningrad
Promoted to Field Marshal on July 1, 1942, von Manstein was sent to the Leningrad front and assigned to lead Operation Northern Lights. Set to launch on September 15, Hitler was confident that with considerable amounts of artillery and the new Tiger tank this operation would finally break the determined Soviet defense; von Manstein, on the other hand, was more pessimistic, arguing that a simultaneous attack in the north by the Finns would be needed for victory.
On August 27, the Soviets launched a spoiling attack against Georg Lindemann’s 18th Army in the narrow German salient west of Lake Ladoga. Von Manstein was forced to divert his forces in order to avoid catastrophe. A series of bitter battles ensued, in which von Manstein's smaller forces managed to outmaneuver the larger Soviet forces, with the loss of over 60,000 men over the next few months.
[edit] Stalingrad
On November 21, 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Adolf Hitler appointed von Manstein the commander of the newly created Army Group Don (Heeresgruppe Don), comprised of a hastily assembled group of tired men and machines, and ordered him to lead Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm), the rescue effort by Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and auxiliary Romanian troops to relieve the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus which was trapped inside the city. Wintergewitter, launched on December 12, achieved some initial success and von Manstein got his three Panzer Divisions and supporting units of the 57th Panzer Corps(comprised of the 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 6th and 17th Panzer Divisions) to within 30 miles of the city by December 20. However, the corps was halted at the River Aksay, and strong Russian forces pushed them back. At this point, von Manstein pleaded for a 6th Army break out attempt, but Paulus refused, since Hitler flatly refused to issue such an order, and instead ordered the 6th Army to stay in the besieged city. It is also doubtful that the 6th Army had the strength to launch offensive operations needed to break through the Soviet lines. It was short of fuel for its tanks and trucks, and short of food for its soldiers. Some argue the defeat at Stalingrad was due to a mistaken decision by Hitler to refuse 6th Army permission to break out. However, the Red Army had to devote a number of their own armies in order to contain 6th Army — forces that otherwise would probably have been used to devastating effect at other points of the weakened German front. It remains debatable whether the fate of 6th Army was more beneficial or detrimental to the Eastern Front on a strategic level.
Operation Saturn, a massive Red Army offensive in the southernmost part of the front, aimed at capturing Rostov and thus cutting off the German Army Group A still withdrawing from the Caucasus, forced von Manstein to divert his forces to help hard-pressed Army Group A in its retreat to the Ukraine, thus avoiding the collapse of the entire front. The attack also prevented the 48th Panzer Corps (comprising the 336th Infantry Division, the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division, and the 11th Panzer Division) under the command of General von Knobelsdorff, from joining up with 57th Panzer Corps as planned. Instead, the Corps held a line along the River Chir, beating off successive Russian attacks. General Hermann Balck particularly distinguished himself[citation needed], using the 11 Panzer Division to counterattack Russian salients. But the Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian armies on the flanks were overwhelmed, and the 48 Panzer Corps was forced to retreat. As a result, the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army retreated, as its northern flank was exposed by the loss of the Don.
[edit] Kharkov Operation
By early February, the German forces started to regroup. Von Manstein's Army Group Don was combined with Army Group B and made into the new Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd), led by von Manstein. On February 21, he launched a counteroffensive into the overextended Soviet flank. The assault proved a major success; von Manstein's troops advanced rapidly, isolating Soviet forward units and forcing the Red Army to halt most of its offensive operations. By March 2, tank spearheads from Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf met, cutting off large portions of the Soviet Southwest Front, and by March 9, the Wehrmacht had inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviets at Krasnograd and Barvenkovo. An estimated 23,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and a further 9,000 were captured. Additionally, 615 Soviet tanks and 354 guns were captured.
Von Manstein then pushed forward, his effort spearheaded by Paul Hausser's 2nd SS Panzer Corps, recapturing Kharkov on March 14, after bloody street-fighting in what is known as the Third Battle of Kharkov. In recognition for this accomplishment, von Manstein received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps then captured Belgorod on March 21. Von Manstein proposed a daring action for the summer nicknamed the "backhand blow", which was intended to outflank the Red Army into the Sea of Azov at Rostov, but Hitler instead chose the more conventional Operation Citadel aimed at crushing the Kursk salient.
[edit] Citadel
During Operation Citadel, von Manstein led the southern pincer, and despite losses, he managed to achieve most of his initial goals, inflicting far more casualties than he sustained. In his memoirs, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who led the Soviet defense at Kursk, praised von Manstein. But due to the almost complete failure of the northern sector's pincer led by Günther von Kluge and Walther Model, chronic lack of infantry support and an operational reserve, as well as Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Italy, Hitler called off the offensive. Von Manstein protested, asserting that the victory was almost at hand as he felt he had achieved local superiority, and that with a little more effort, he could crack the Soviet defenses before they could bring up their reserves. After the failure of Citadel, the Soviets launched a massive counterattack against the exhausted German forces.
A German victory in the sense of annihilating the surrounded Soviet forces required: 1) The completion of the encirclement (that is the linking of the northern and southern German pincers) 2) Holding the encirclement long enough to overcome the encircled Soviet forces. Even if the first had been accomplished (which it was not), it does not follow that the second would automatically follow. The German forces post-Stalingrad were never able to force the Soviets into significant retreats (except for temporary reversals like Kharkov). After halting the German offensive at Kursk, the Soviets had enough strength to launch immediate counterattacks.
[edit] Dnieper Campaign
In September, he withdrew to the west bank of the river Dnieper, while inflicting heavy casualties on the Red Army. From October to mid-January of 1944, von Manstein "stabilized" the situation. The Soviets established a salient from Kiev, and were within reach of the crucial town of Zhitomir. But the Germans staged a successful counteroffensive. SS Panzer Divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich, together with 1st, 7th, 19th, and 25th Panzer Divisions, and 68th Infantry Division (part of 4th Panzer Army), wheeled around the flank of the Russians in front of Zhitomir. Several notable victories were won, at Brussilov, Radomyshl, and Meleni, under the guidance of General Balck, but due to the lackluster judgment of Colonel General Rauss,[citation needed] the new commander of 4th Panzer Army, the Kiev salient could not be eliminated. In late January, von Manstein was forced to retreat further westwards by the Soviet offensive. In mid-February 1944, he disobeyed Hitler's order and ordered 11th and 42nd Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South to break out from the "Korsun Pocket", which occurred on February 16–17. Eventually, Hitler accepted this action and ordered the breakout after it had already taken place.
[edit] Dismissal
Von Manstein continued to argue with Hitler about overall strategy on the Eastern Front. Von Manstein advocated an elastic, mobile defense and was ready to cede territory, attempting to make the Soviet forces either stretch out too thinly or to make them advance too fast so that they could be attacked on the flanks with the goal of encircling them. Hitler however ignored Manstein's advice and continued to insist on static warfare. Because of these frequent disagreements, von Manstein publicly advocated that Hitler relinquish control and leave the management of the war to professionals, starting with the establishment of the position of Oberbefehlshaber Ost (Supreme Commander in the East); Hitler however rejected this idea numerous times, fearing that it would weaken his hold on power.
This argument also alarmed some of Hitler's closest henchmen, such as Göring and the SS chief Himmler, who were not prepared to give up any of their powers. Himmler started to openly question von Manstein's loyalty and implied he was a defeatist unsuitable to command troops. Von Manstein's frequent arguing combined with these allegations resulted, in March 1944, of Hitler relieving von Manstein of his command and on April 2, 1944, instead appointing Walther Model, a fervent Nazi, as the commander of Southern Army Group. Nevertheless, von Manstein received the Swords for his Knight's Cross, the second highest German military honour.
After his dismissal, he entered an eye clinic in Breslau, recuperated near Dresden, and then retired. He did not take part in the attempt to kill Hitler in July 1944. He had been contacted by Henning von Tresckow and others in 1943, but while he did agree that change was necessary, he had refused to join them, as he still considered himself bound by duty. (He rejected the approaches with the statement "Preussische Feldmarschälle meutern nicht"—"Prussian Field Marshals do not mutiny.") He also feared that a civil war would ensue. Though he didn't join them, he did not betray the plotters either. In late January of 1945, he collected his family from their homes in Liegnitz and evacuated them to western Germany. He surrendered to British Field Marshal Montgomery and was arrested by British troops on August 23, 1945.
[edit] Post war
[edit] Trial
During the Nuremberg trials in 1946, he was only called as a witness for the defense. Von Manstein was subsequently interned by the British as a prisoner of war in "Special Camp 11" in Bridgend. Later, because of pressure from the Soviets, who wanted him extradited to stand trial in the USSR, the British accepted their indictments and charged him with war crimes, putting him on trial before a British Military Tribunal in Hamburg in August 1949. In part because of the Soviet demands in the Cold War environment, and respect for his military exploits, many in the British military establishment, such as Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and the renowned military strategist B. H. Liddell Hart, openly expressed sympathy for von Manstein's plight and, along with the likes of Sir Winston Churchill, donated money for the defense. Churchill saw the trial as yet another effort of the then ruling Attlee government to appease the Soviets.
In court, von Manstein's defense, led by the prominent lawyer Reginald Thomas Paget, argued that he had been unaware that genocide was taking place in the territory under his control. It was argued that von Manstein didn't enforce the Commissar order, which called for the immediate execution of Red Army Communist Party commissars. According to his testimony at the Nuremberg trials, Volume 20, pp. 608–609 (August 10, 1946) [1], he received it, but refused to carry it out. He claimed that his superior at the time, Field Marshal von Leeb, tolerated and tacitly approved of his choice, and he also claimed that the order was not carried out in practice.
However, von Manstein did issue an order on November 20, 1941: his version of the infamous "Reichenau Order" [2], which equated "partisans" and "Jews" and called for draconian measures against them. Hitler and Field Marshal von Rundstedt commended the "Reichenau Order" as exemplary and encouraged other generals to issue similar orders. Von Manstein was among the minority that voluntarily issued such an order. It stated that:
- "This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed Forces alone in the established form laid down by European rules of warfare.
- Behind the front too, the fighting continues. Partisan snipers dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units and try to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mines and infernal machines. Bolshevists left behind keep the population freed from Bolshevism in a state of unrest by means of terror and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly delivered to starvation.
- Jewry is the middleman between the enemy in the rear and the remains of the Red Army and the Red leadership still fighting. More strongly than in Europe they hold all key positions of political leadership and administration, of trade and crafts and constitutes a cell for all unrest and possible uprisings.
- The Jewish Bolshevik system must be wiped out once and for all and should never again be allowed to invade our European living space.
- The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people."
- ...
- "The soldier must appreciate the necessity for the harsh punishment of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevik terror. This is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings which are mostly plotted by Jews."
- (Nuremberg trials proceedings, Vol. 20, pp. 639–645 [3])
The order also stated: "The food situation at home makes it essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed off the land and that furthermore the largest possible stocks should be placed at the disposal of the homeland. Particularly in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry."(ibid.) This also was one of the indictments against von Manstein in Hamburg; not only neglect of civilians, but also exploitation of invaded countries for the sole benefit of the "homeland", something considered illegal by the then current laws of war.
The order additionally stated that "severe steps will be taken against arbitrary action and self-interest, against savagery and indiscipline, against any violation of the honor of the soldier" and that "respect for religious customs, particularly those of Muslim Tartars, must be demanded." (ibid.) The evidence for this order was first presented by prosecutor Telford Taylor on August 10, 1946, in Nuremberg; von Manstein acknowledged that he had signed this order of November 20, 1941, but claimed that he didn't remember it. This order was a major piece of evidence for the prosecution at his Hamburg trial.
While Paget got von Manstein acquitted of many of the seventeen charges, he was still found guilty of two charges and accountable for seven others, mainly for employing scorched earth tactics and for failing to protect the civilian population, and was sentenced on December 19, 1949, to 18 years imprisonment. This caused a massive uproar among von Manstein's supporters and the sentence was subsequently reduced to 12 years. However, he was released on May 6 1953 for medical reasons.
Von Manstein, one of the highest ranking generals in the Wehrmacht, claimed ignorance of what was happening in the concentration camps. In the Nuremberg trials, he was asked "Did you at that time know anything about conditions in the concentration camps?" to which he replied "No. I heard as little about that as the German people, or possibly even less, because when one was fighting 1,000 kilometers away from Germany, one naturally did not hear about such things. I knew from prewar days that there were two concentration camps, Oranienburg and Dachau, and an officer who at the invitation of the SS had visited such a camp told me that it was simply a typical collection of criminals, besides some political prisoners who, according to what he had seen, were being treated severely but correctly." [4])
Von Manstein's adjutant Alexander Stahlberg reported to Bryan Mark Rigg (author of Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers) the following: Stahlberg pressed von Manstein about the huge numbers of Jews being slaughtered, von Manstein fixed him with a stare. "Do you really believe that?" the Field Marshal said. Stahlberg said he did. "Well, if this really happened," Manstein said, "they're only Jews." [5]
[edit] Senior adviser
Called on by the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, von Manstein served as his senior defense advisory and chaired a military sub-committee appointed to advise the parliament on military organization and doctrine for the new German Army, the Bundeswehr and its incorporation into NATO. He later moved with his family to Bavaria. His war memoirs, Verlorene Siege (Lost Victories), were published in Germany in 1955, and translated into English in 1958. In them, he presented the thesis that if the generals had been in charge of strategy instead of Hitler, the war on the Eastern Front could have been won.
Never having been a member of the Nazi party, he had no trouble in West Germany, unlike some of the Reich's more notorious Hitler supporters. Because of his influence, for the first few years of the Bundeswehr, he was seen as the unofficial chief of staff. Even later, his birthday parties were regularly attended by official delegations of Bundeswehr and NATO top leaders, such as General Hans Speidel who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied ground forces in Central Europe from 1957 to 1963. This wasn't the case with pro-Nazi Field Marshals such as Milch, Schörner, von Küchler, and others, who were disregarded and forgotten after the war.
Erich von Manstein died at Irschenhausen, Bavaria, in June 1973. He was buried with full military honors. His obituary in The Times on June 13 1973, stated that "His influence and effect came from powers of mind and depth of knowledge rather than by generating an electrifying current among the troops or 'putting over' his personality."
[edit] Quotes about von Manstein
- "He was not only the most brilliant strategist of all our generals, but he had a good political sense. A man of that quality was too difficult for Hitler to swallow for long. At conferences Manstein often differed from Hitler, in front of others, and would go so far as to declare that some of the ideas which Hitler put forward were nonsense." Günther Blumentritt
- "The general verdict among the German generals I interrogated in 1945 was that Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in their Army, and the man they had most desired to become its Commander-in-Chief. It is very clear that he had a superb sense of operational possibilities and equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanized forces than any other commander who had not been trained in the tank arm. In sum, he had military genius." B. H. Liddell Hart
- "He is the best tactician and combat commander we have" Wolfram von Richthofen
- "Master of the Blitzkrieg" J.F.C. Fuller
- "Manstein despised Göring and loathed Himmler. To his most trusted colleagues he admitted to Jewish antedescents. He could also be scathing about Hitler. As a joke, his dachshund Knirps had been trained to raise his paw in salute on the command "Heil Hitler". On the other hand, his wife was a great admirer of Hitler, and more importantly, Manstein, as already mentioned, had even issued that order to his troops mentioning "the necessity of hard measures against Jewry" Anthony Beevor (Stalingrad, 1998, Penguin, p273)
- "He had utter disdain for the Nazis and had no time for their racial purity agenda" Nuremberg Trials transcripts.
[edit] References
- Barnett, Correlli (ed.) (2003). Hitler's Generals (reprint ed.). Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-3994-9. Original edition first published in 1989.
- Carver, Sir Michael (1976). The War Lords: Military Commanders Of The Twentieth Century. Boston: Little Brown & Co. ISBN 0-316-13060-5
- Engelmann, Joachim (1981). Manstein, Stratege und Truppenführer: ein Lebensbericht in Bildern. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag. ISBN 3-7909-0159-8
- Glantz, David M. (2002). Black Sea Inferno: The German Storm of Sevastopol 1941–1942. Spellmount Publishers. ISBN 1-86227-161-5
- Liddell Hart, B. H. (1999). The Other Side of the Hill (2nd ed). Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-37324-2. 1st edition originally published in 1948.
- von Manstein, Erich (2002). Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert. Bernard & Graefe. ISBN 3-7637-5214-5
- von Manstein, Erich; Powell, Anthony G.; Hart, B. H. Liddell; Blumenson, Martin (2004). Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press. ISBN 0-7603-2054-3
- von Mellenthin, Friedrich W. (1956). Panzer Battles. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Paget, Baron Reginald Thomas (1957). Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial. London: Collins.
- Stahlberg, Alexander (1990). Bounden Duty: The Memoirs of a German Officer, 1932–1945. London: Brassey’s. ISBN 3-548-33129-7
- The British records of the Manstein Trial are now housed in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, at King’s College, London.
- Von Manstein's whole testimonial at Nuremberg is spread out over three files at the Yale Avalon project: [6], [7] (contains von Manstein's order of November 20, 1941), and [8].
- Obituary of Manstein by The Times published on June 13, 1973 [9]
[edit] External links
- (Fritz) Erich von Manstein / von Lewinski at Achtung Panzer!
- Chronology.
- Erich von Manstein – ein unpolitischer Soldat?—A critical assessment of von Manstein by Michael Schröders (in German).
- The New York Review of Books: How Wrong Was Churchill? by Noel Annan
- Erich von Manstein's Counterattack by F.W. Weatherbee, Jr.—Encompass: A Journal of Military History Vol. I No. 1; February 2004.
- Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory by George M. Nipe, Jr.—World War II Articles 1998
- The Crimean Campaign—1942 by Victor Nitu; worldwar2.ro
- The Crimean Campaign at wehrmacht-awards.com
