Francais | English | Espanõl

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For the August, 1942 Allied landings on Tulagi see Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo

Invasion of Tulagi
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
Image:TulagiJapanese1942.gif Japanese officers and petty officers of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force that seized Tulagi in May, 1942.
Date May 3, 1942 – May 4, 1942 Location Tulagi and Gavutu Islands, Solomon Islands Result Japanese forces occupied Tulagi and nearby islands
Combatants
Australia, United Kingdom, United States (U.S.)	Empire of Japan
Commanders
William Sydney Marchant (land), Frank Jack Fletcher (naval)	Isoroku Yamamoto, Shigeyoshi Inoue, Aritomo Goto, Kiyohide Shima
Strength
1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 58 aircraft<ref name="Okinoshima">Hackett, CombinedFleet.com, "IJN Minelayer OKINOSHIMA: Tabular Record of Movement."</ref>	2 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, 2 minelayers, 1 transport ship, 2 subchasers, 6 aircraft<ref name="Death">D'Albas, Death of a Navy, p. 110.</ref><ref>Hackett, Combinedfleet.com.</ref>
Casualties
4 aircraft destroyed	1 destroyer, 3 minesweepers sunk, 1 destroyer, 2 minelayers, 1 transport damaged, 5-6 aircraft destroyed, 87 killed<ref>Hackett, CombinedFleet.com, "IJN Minelayer OKINOSHIMA: Tabular Record of Movement," and IJN Seaplane Tender KIYOKAWA MARU: Tabular Record of Movement." Aircraft losses included two to four F1M2 "Petes" and one or two E8N2 "Daves" from Kiyokawa Maru and Kamikawa Maru.</ref><ref name="Gill44">Gill, Royal Australian Navy, p. 44.</ref>

Solomon Islands campaign
1st Tulagi – Guadalcanal – Blackett Strait – Cartwheel – Death of Yamamoto – New Georgia – Kula Gulf – Kolombangara – Vella Gulf – Horaniu – Vella Lavella – Naval Vella Lavella – Treasury Is. – Choiseul – Empress Augusta Bay – Cape St. George – Green Is. – 2nd Rabaul – Bougainville

Pacific campaigns 1941-42
Pearl Harbor – Thailand – Malaya – Wake – Hong Kong – Philippines – Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean – Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway

Pacific Ocean campaign
Pearl Harbor – Wake Island – Doolittle Raid – Midway – Aleutian Islands – Guadalcanal – Solomon Islands – Gilbert and Marshall Islands – Marianas and Palau – Volcano and Ryūkyū Islands

The invasion of Tulagi, on May 3 and 4, 1942, was part of Operation Mo, the Empire of Japan's strategy in the South Pacific and South West Pacific Area in 1942. The plan called for Imperial Japanese Navy troops to capture Tulagi and nearby islands in the southern Solomon Islands. The occupation of Tulagi by the Japanese was intended to cover the flank of Japanese forces that were advancing on Port Moresby in New Guinea as well as to provide a base for Japanese forces to threaten and interdict the supply and communication routes between the United States and Australia and New Zealand.

Without the means to capably resist the Japanese offensive in the Solomons, the British Resident Commissioner of the Solomon Islands protectorate and the few Australian troops assigned to defend Tulagi evacuated the island just before the Japanese forces arrived on May 3. The next day, however, a U.S. aircraft carrier task force enroute to resist the Japanese forces advancing on Port Moresby that resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea, struck the Japanese Tulagi landing force in an air attack, destroying or damaging several of the Japanese ships and aircraft involved in the landing operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese troops successfully occupied Tulagi and began the construction of a small naval base.

Over the next several months, the Japanese established a naval refueling, communications, and seaplane base on Tulagi and the nearby islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo and, in July, 1942, began to build a large airfield on nearby Guadalcanal. The Japanese activities on Tulagi and Guadalcanal were observed by Allied reconnaissance aircraft as well as by Australian coastwatcher personnel stationed in the area. Due to the threat to the Allied supply and communication lines in the South Pacific posed by the Japanese base at Tulagi and the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal, Allied forces counter-attacked with landings of their own on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 7, 1942, resulting in the critical Guadalcanal campaign and series of combined arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces that, along with the New Guinea campaign, would decide the course of the war in the South Pacific.

Contents 1 Background 2 Landings and air attacks 3 Aftermath 4 References 4.1 Notes 4.2 Books 4.3 Web

[edit] Background

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet and led to a state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the U.S. fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. In the words of the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet Secret Order Number One, dated November 1, 1941, the goals of the initial Japanese campaigns in the war impending war were to, "(eject) British and American strength from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, (and) to establish a policy of autonomous self-sufficiency and economic independence."<ref>Parker, A Priceless Advantage, p. 3.</ref> To support these goals, during the first few months of 1942 Japanese forces also attacked and took control of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, and Guam.<ref>Murray, War to be Won, p. 169-195</ref>

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the Japanese 4th Fleet (also called the South Seas Force) consisting of most of the naval units in the South Pacific area, advocated the seizing of Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Inoue believed that the capture and control of these locations would provide greater security for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. Japan's Naval General Staff endorsed Inoue's argument and began planning further operations, using these locations as supporting bases, to seize Nauru, Ocean Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa and thereby cut the supply lines between Australia and the United States with the goal of reducing or eliminating Australia as a threat to Japanese positions in the South Pacific.<ref>Parker, A Priceless Advantage, p. 5, and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 21-22.</ref>

The Japanese Imperial Army supported the idea of taking Port Moresby and in April, 1942, with the Japanese Navy, developed a plan for the attack that was titled Operation Mo. The plan also included the seizure of Tulagi, a small island in the southern Solomon Islands. Although Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, was concurrently planning an operation that he hoped would lure the U.S. Navy's Pacific fleet into a decisive showdown in the central Pacific, he detached some of his large warships to support the Mo operation and placed Inoue in charge of the naval portion of the operation. A large force consisting of two heavy aircraft carriers, one light aircraft carrier, a seaplane carrier, nine cruisers, and 13 destroyers, split into several elements, was to guard the Japanese Port Moresby invasion convoy as well as to engage any Allied naval warships that approached to contest the invasion. The Tulagi invasion force, consisting of the destroyers Kikuzuki and Yuzuki, minelayers Okinoshima, and Koei Maru, minesweepers #1, #2, Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru #2, and Tama Maru, subchasers Toshi Maru #3 and Tama Maru #8, and transport Azumasan Maru and commanded by Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima, departed from Rabaul on April 29 and headed towards the Solomon Islands. Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto provided distant cover for the Tulagi invasion with his force of one light carrier, four cruisers, and one destroyer located just west of the central Solomons.<ref>Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 122-124.</ref><ref name="Death" /><ref name="Gill42">Gill, Royal Australian Navy, p. 42.</ref><ref name="Okinoshima" />

At that time, Tulagi was the capital of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate that included all of the islands of the Solomons except Bougainville and Buka. The resident commissioner of the Solomons, described by historian Walter Lord as a "bewildered elderly Englishman" was William Sydney Marchant. Marchant had already directed the evacuation of most of the European settlers and his staff from the Solomons to Australia in February, 1942 and he himself evacuated to Malaita the following month.<ref>Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 2-5, 9.</ref> Remaining at Tulagi were 24 soldiers from the Australian Army's 2/1st Independent Company (a commando unit), under Captain A. L. Goode, and around 25 personnel from 11 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (R.A.A.F.), under Flying Officer R. B. Peagam, operating a seaplane base on nearby Gavutu-Tanambogo with four PBY Catalina reconnaissance aircraft.<ref>McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area, p. 63, and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 28.</ref><ref name="Gill42" /> Also located in the Tulagi area were three Australian coastwatchers on Guadalcanal island. Under the direction of Eric Feldt, who was located at Townsville in northern Australia, the coastwatchers were assigned to report on any suspicious activity that they observed in the vicinity of their assigned stations.<ref>Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 6-7.</ref> Throughout most of April, the Japanese conducted "desultory" bombing raids on Tulagi that caused little, if any, damage. The coastwatchers on Guadalcanal were usually able to radio advance warning to the Australian troops on Tulagi of the approaching Japanese aircraft, but the troops didn't have large enough weaponry to seriously challenge the Japanese bombers. On April 25, Tulagi was bombed by eight Japanese aircraft with similar raids occurring daily over the next week, with one raid on May 1 destroying one of the Catalinas at Gavutu.<ref>McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area, p. 80, and Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 10-11</ref>

Allied intelligence personnel had deciphered much of the Japanese Mo plans through radio intercepts at radio intelligence centers located at Melbourne, Australia and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.<ref>Parker, A Priceless Advantage, p. 11.</ref> Based on this intelligence, on April 22, U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, directed Allied forces towards the Coral Sea area to interdict the Japanese Mo operation. On April 27, the U.S. carrier Yorktown task force, under the command of U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, sortied from Tonga and was joined by the U.S. carrier Lexington's task force near the New Hebrides on May 1. The two task forces, operating semi-independently of each other, prepared to engage any Japanese forces operating in the Coral Sea area.<ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 83-86.</ref>

[edit] Landings and air attacks

On May 2, coastwatcher Jack Read on Bougainville reported that a large force of Japanese ships, believed to be part of the Japanese Tulagi invasion force, had departed from the Buka area. Later that day, coastwatcher D. G. Kennedy on New Georgia island sighted and reported a large Japanese force of ships heading towards the southern Solomons.<ref>Feuer, Coastwatching in WWII, p. 36-37. What Read probably saw were ships from Goto's support force (Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 129 (map).</ref>Soon after, Goode and Peagam, anticipating that the Japanese would attack with overwhelming numbers, ordered the execution of a pre-planned evacuation operation and began the destruction and demolition of their equipment and facilities on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. The R.A.A.F. personnel and commandos then embarked on two small ships at nightfall, May 2 to begin ther trip to Vila, New Hebrides.<ref name="Gill42" /> The ship with the R.A.A.F. personnel overnighted with coastwatcher Martin Clemens at Aola on Guadalcanal and departed at 08:00 the next morning, just as Shima's ships entered Savo sound to begin their landings on Tulagi.<ref>Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 12-13.</ref>

Supporting the Japanese landings were seaplanes from the Japanese seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru, based at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel island.<ref>Hackett, Combinedfleet.com. Aircraft from the Japanese seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, undergoing repair in Japan, were temporarily assigned to augment Kamikawa Maru's complement of aircraft.</ref> The Japanese troops, from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, disembarked from the transport ship on barges and immediately began construction of facilities on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo.<ref>Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 13.</ref> Once the Japanese troops were ashore, six seaplanes landed in Tulagi harbor as part of the establishment of the planned seaplane base there.<ref>AWM, Coral Sea</ref>

At 17:00 on May 3, Fletcher received information that U.S. Army reconnaissance aircraft based in Australia had sighted the Japanese Tulagi invasion force the day before approaching the southern Solomons. Since Lexington was occupied with keeping a rendezvous with an Allied cruiser force coming from Sydney, Australia, Yorktown's task force proceeded independently towards the Solomons in order to be in position to launch airstrikes against the Japanese forces at Tulagi the next morning.<ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 86, Gill, Royal Australian Navy, p. 43, and Parker, A Priceless Advantage, p. 27. Yorktown's task force included the U.S. cruisers Astoria, Chester, and Portland, plus the U.S. destroyers Hammann, Anderson, Perkins, and Sims.</ref>

At 07:01 on May 4, Yorktown launched her first strike consisting of 12 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers and 28 SBD Dauntless dive bombers from a position about 100 miles south of Guadalcanal. The aircraft began their attacks on Shima's ships anchored off Tulagi at 08:50, taking the Japanese ships completely by surprise and at anchor.<ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 87.</ref> The Okinoshima and the two destroyers were positioned to provide a protective barrier for Shima's other ships that were busy unloading troops and materiel. Although the U.S. pilots from the first strike claimed many bomb and torpedo hits on the anchored ships, they actually only hit Okinoshima, causing minor damage, and Kikuzuki, causing major damage. Kikuzuki, with the assistance of one of the subchasers, was beached on Gavutu in an attempt to keep her from sinking. During this time, all of the other ships weighed anchor and attempted to escape from the harbor. One U.S. dive bomber destroyed a Japanese F1M2 "Pete" seaplane that attempted to take-off during the attack.<ref name="Dull127">Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 127.</ref><ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 87-88, and Nevitt, Combinedfleet.com, "IJN Kikuzuki: Tabular Record of Movement."</ref> Yorktown's second strike, utilizing the same aircraft, returned to Tulagi and began their attack at 12:10 on the Japanese ships, many of which were now at full steam and attempting to put distance between themselves and Tulagi harbor. The second strike hit and sank the minesweepers #1 and #2 and severely damaged Tama Maru northeast of Savo Island. Another Japanese seaplane was shot-down by a U.S. dive bomber during the second strike. After four F4F Wildcat fighters from Yorktown joined the strike, the fighters shot down two more Japanese floatplanes over Florida Island. The four U.S. fighters then strafed Yuzuki, killing her captain and nine others of her crew, and causing moderate damage to the ship. Two or three other Japanese floatplanes were damaged in Tulagi harbor.<ref name="Dull127" /><ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 89-91.</ref><ref>Hackett, Combinedfleet.com, "IJN Seaplane Tender KIYOKAWA MARU:

Tabular Record of Movement."</ref>

A third, smaller strike from Yorktown arrived at 15:30 and caused moderate damage to Azumasan Maru and Okinoshima. One of the TBD aircraft in the third strike became lost, ran out of fuel, and ditched in the ocean about 40 miles south of Guadalcanal. Two of the wildcat fighters from the second strike also ran out of fuel and crash landed on the southern coast of Guadalcanal. Fletcher sent Hammann and Perkins to rescue the aircrews from the three aircraft. Hammann was able to recover both fighter pilots, but Perkins was unable to locate the TBD crew. Both destroyers returned to Yorktown's task force late that evening and the task force turned away from Guadalcanal towards the southeast to refuel the next day.<ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 91-94.</ref>

Fletcher radioed back to Pearl Harbor "Fitch delayed by fueling. All joined up now." He reported "positive enemy losses: sunk two destroyers, four tugs or gunboats, one cargo ship. Beached and sunk: one light cruiser. Very badly damaged, possibly sunk: one 9,000 ton seaplane tender, one large tender. Badly damaged: one large cruiser, one transport. Shot down: five seaplanes." He concluded with "Some fun!" Nimitz radioed back from Pearl Harbor saying: "Congratulations and well done to you and your force. Hope you can exploit your success with augmented force." Later air reconnaissance and radio intelligence showed that Fletcher's report was extremely exaggerated. This reflected the difficulty and inexperience aviators had in assessing losses during battle. Nimitz later stated that Flecther's actions were "certainly disappointing in terms of ammunition expended to results obtained," and he also brought into view "the necessity for target practice at every opportunity."

[edit] Aftermath

On May 5, Kikuzuki slid off of the shore of Gavutu and sank in Tulagi harbor, a total loss. Tama Maru foundered two days later due to the heavy damage that she received in Yorktown's airstrikes. The other, surviving Japanese ships made it back to Rabaul and were repaired. On May 10, as Okinoshima led the first Japanese attempt to take Ocean (Banaba) and Nauru Islands, she was sunk by the U.S. submarine S-42 off New Ireland.<ref>Nevitt, Combinedfleet.com, "IJN Kikuzuki: Tabular Record of Movement."</ref><ref>Hackett, Combinedfleet.com, "IJN Minelayer OKINOSHIMA: Tabular Record of Movement." The rest of the Japanese ships later turned back after receiving reports of U.S. carriers in the Ocean Island/Nauru area. Ocean Island and Nauru were later occupied by Japanese forces in August, 1942.</ref> A total of 87 Japanese navy personnel died in the May 4 air attacks on Tulagi and 20 of the landing troops were seriously injured.<ref name="Dull127" /><ref name="Gill44" /> The lost Yorktown TBD aircrew reached Guadalcanal after drifting in the ocean for three days. A Catholic missionary took them to Martin Clemens who arranged for a boat to take them to San Cristobal. From San Cristobal another boat took them to the New Hebrides and from there they eventually rejoined U.S. forces.<ref>Cressman, That Gallant Ship, p. 92.</ref><ref>Lord, Lonely Vigil, p. 16.</ref>

After striking Tulagi, Yorktown rejoined with Lexington and the two carriers engaged the rest of the Japanese forces involved in the Mo operation May 6 - 8 in the Battle of the Coral Sea. In the battle, Lexington was sunk and Yorktown was damaged. The Japanese however, retreated from their planned assault on Port Moresby with the intention of trying again later. The next Japanese seaborne attempt to take Port Moresby, however, never happened, mainly due to their navy's defeat in June at the Battle of Midway. Instead, the Japanese decided to try to take Port Moresby in an overland attack along the Kokoda Trail. The failure to take Port Moresby in May, 1942 would have significant and far-reaching strategic implications, many of which involved the small Japanese naval base at Tulagi.<ref>Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 17, 24-25.</ref>

In spite of the damaging air attacks to their ships and landing forces, the Japanese proceeded with the construction of the naval seaplane base at Tulagi and Gavutu, receiving more shipments of troops and construction workers over the next several months. The base was soon operational and began conducting air reconnaissance patrols throughout the surrounding area. On May 27, the Japanese inspected the Lunga Point area on Guadalcanal as a possible location to build a large airfield. On June 13, the Naval General Staff approved the construction of an airfield at that location and on June 19, Admiral Inoue himself toured the site in anticipation of the airfield construction effort. The next day Japanese troops began clearing the area of brush and on July 6, a 12 ship convoy delivered 2,000 Korean construction workers plus 500 Japanese naval combat troops to conduct the airfield construction effort in earnest. The Australian coastwatchers on Guadalcanal and Allied air reconnaissance observed the Japanese airfield construction efforts.<ref>Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 31.</ref>

The Allies were greatly concerned about the Japanese airfield construction effort on Guadalcanal as, when completed, the aircraft operating from the airfield would be a signficant threat to Allied operations between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The two strategic victories for the Allies in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific. An Allied plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines.<ref>Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 12.</ref> U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Allied commander in chief for Pacific forces, created the South Pacific theater, with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in command, to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.<ref>Murray, War to be Won, p. 199-200.</ref>

The failure of the Japanese to take Port Moresby and their defeat at Midway had the effect of "dangling" their base at Tulagi without effective protection from other Japanese bases. Tulagi was four hours flying time from Rabaul and there were no other Japanese bases any closer with enough forces to secure Tulagi from a major assault.<ref>Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 194-213.</ref> On August 7, 1942, 11,000 U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal and 3,000 U.S. Marines landed on Tulagi and nearby islands.<ref>Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 51, and Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 15.</ref> The Japanese troops on Tulagi and nearby islands were outnumbered and killed almost to the last man in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. The U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal captured the airfield at Lunga Point without significant resistance.<ref>Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 61-62, 79-81.</ref> Thus, began the Guadalcanal campaign that resulted in a series of large, combined-arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces over the next six months which, along with the New Guinea campaign, would decide the fate of Japanese efforts to secure the southern frontier of their empire in the Pacific.

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

[edit] Books

• Cressman, Robert (2000 (4th printing)). That Gallant Ship U.S.S. Yorktown (CV-5). Missoula, Montana, U.S.A.: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company. ISBN 0-933126-57-3.
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
• Feuer, A. B. (1992). Coastwatching in World War II (Stackpole Military History Series). Westport, Connecticut, U.S.A.: Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-3329-7.
• Frank, Richard (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-394-58875-4.
• Hoyt, Edwin P. (2003). Blue Skies and Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea. I Books. ISBN 0-7434-5835-4.
• Henry, Chris (2003). The Battle of the Coral Sea. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-033-1.
• Lord, Walter (1977 (Reissue 2006)). Lonely Vigil; Coastwatchers of the Solomons. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-466-3.
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1949 (reissue 2001)). Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942, vol. 4 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Champaign, Illinois, USA: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06995-1.
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7. Online views of selections of the book:[1]
• Murray, Williamson, Allan R. Millett (2001). A War To Be Won : Fighting the Second World War. United States of America: Belknap Press. ISBN 0-674-00680-1.

[edit] Web

• Australian War Memorial (AWM). Battle of the Coral Sea. Encyclopedia. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Volume II – Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. Official Histories – Second World War. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Hackett, Bob; Sander Kingsepp (1998-2005). IJN Minelayer OKINOSHIMA: Tabular Record of Movement. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Hackett, Bob; Sander Kingsepp, Allan Alsleben and Peter Cundall (1998-2006). IJN Seaplane Tender KAMIKAWA MARU: Tabular Record of Movement. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Hackett, Bob; Sander Kingsepp, Allan Alsleben and Peter Cundall (1998-2005). IJN Seaplane Tender KIYOKAWA MARU: Tabular Record of Movement. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• McCarthy, Dudley (1959). Volume V – South–West Pacific Area – First Year: Kokoda to Wau. Official Histories – Second World War. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved on November 2, 2006.
• Naval Historical Center (2000). Battle of the Coral Sea, 7-8 May 1942. Online Library of Selected Images: EVENTS -- World War II in the Pacific. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Nevitt, Allyn D. (1998). IJN Kikuzuki: Tabular Record of Movement. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Nevitt, Allyn D. (1998). IJN Yuzuki: Tabular Record of Movement. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Office of Naval Intelligence (1943). The Battle of the Coral Sea. Combat Narrative. Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy. Retrieved on 2006-11-20.
• Parker, Frederick D.. Part One: The Battle of the Coral Sea. A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians. National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) - Naval Analysis Division (1946). Chapter 4: The Battle of the Coral Sea. The Campaigns of the Pacific War. United States Government Printing Office. Retrieved on 2006-11-20.