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Reform of the House of Lords

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Image:PalaceOfWestminsterAtNight.jpg For almost a century, governments in the United Kingdom (UK) have attempted to find a way to undertake a comprehensive reform of the House of Lords, which is the upper house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. When the Labour Party came to power in the 1997 general election, it had in its manifesto the promise to reform the House of Lords:

   
Reform of the House of Lords
 We are committed to completing House of Lords reform, including removal of the remaining hereditary peers, to make it more representative and democratic.<ref>Labour Party 1997 Election Manifesto</ref>
   
Reform of the House of Lords

In 2001 the government undertook a public consultation. This helped to create an unprecedented public debate on the issue of Lords reform, with 1101 consultation responses and numerous debates in Parliament and the media. Despite this huge level of interest in the issue, and a second public consultation, no consensus on the way forward has yet emerged.

Contents

[edit] History of reform

[edit] Reform before 1997

For details see: Lords Reform - History

[edit] Powers as of 1997 Election

Originally, the two Houses of Parliament had equal legislative powers. The agreement of both was necessary before a bill could be submitted to the Monarch for royal assent, which if granted made the bill an Act of Parliament. After the English Restoration, a constitutional convention arose that the House of Lords would defer to the House of Commons on measures to raise and spend money. The Parliament Act 1911 divided Bills into three classes.

  1. Money bills which, failing consent from the Lords within one month, could receive royal assent without it.
  2. Other bills on which the House of Lords could exercise a suspensory veto.
  3. On any bill extending the maximum term of the House of Commons beyond five years, the House of Lords retained equal legislative powers.

Together with the Parliament Act 1949, these two acts enable the Commons (in exceptional circumstance) to pass legislation without approval from the Lords but subject to certain time delays. In effect, they give the House of Lords the power to delay legislation but not to prevent it. Since 1911 there have been various attempts to reform the Lords, but none tackled the powers of the House except the Parliament Act 1949 which reduced the suspensory veto to two sessions and one year. By the time of the 1997 general election there was still no consensus on comprehensive reform of the upper chamber of Parliaments.


[edit] Reform process since 1997

In 1999, the Government did a deal with the Lords to remove most of the hereditary Peers and passed the House of Lords Act 1999 leaving amongst the majority of appointed Peers a rump of 92 Hereditary Peers until the second phase of reform was complete. These 92 were elected from within those who had had a right to be members of the House of Lords as a result of their hereditary status. This arrangement was intended to be purely temporary until "the second stage of reform was completed" <ref>House of Lords Act 1999</ref>. This led to some claims (perhaps not all serious) that the elected Hereditary Lords were the only democratic members of the House.

[edit] Royal Commission

In 1999 a Royal Commission was appointed, under Baron Wakeham, to examine proposals for Lords Reform and make recommendations. It published its report (See Wakeham Report<ref name=RoyalCommission>Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, January 2000</ref>) in 2000 with 132 recommendations of which the main were:

  • It should have around 550 members of which 67, 87 or 195 should be elected.
  • There should be an independent Appointments Commission responsible for all appointments.
  • The new second chamber should have the capacity to offer counsel from a range of sources. It should be broadly representative of society in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 21st century. It should work with the House of Commons to provide an effective check upon the Government. It should give the United Kingdom’s constituent nations and regions, for the first time, a formally constituted voice in the Westminster Parliament.
  • The Commons should be the principal political forum, should have the final say in respect of all major public policy issues, including those expressed in the form of proposed legislation. The second chamber should have sufficient power, and the associated authority, to require the Government and the House of Commons to reconsider proposed legislation and take account of any cogent objections to it.
  • The House of Lords should contain a substantial proportion of people who are not professional politicians, who have continuing experience in a range of different walks of life and who can bring a broad range of expertise to bear on issues of public concern. and representation of the reformed second chamber should match that of the country as expressed in votes cast at the most recent general election but it should not be capable of being dominated by any one political party and continue to include people who can help it to maintain a philosophical, moral or spiritual perspective on public policy issues.
  • Possession of a peerage should no longer be a necessary qualification for membership
  • Provisions should be in place to permit ministers to be drawn from the Upper House
  • The upper House should ensure changes to constitution are not made without full and open debate and that there is increased scrutiny of secondary legislation
  • The commission could not recommend: a wholly or largely directly elected second chamber; indirect election from the devolved institutions (or local government electoral colleges) or from among British MEPs; random selection, or co-option.

In the debate in the House of Lords (7 March 2000), Baroness Jay expressed the Government's broad acceptance of the Commission's report:

The Government accept the principles underlying the main elements of the Royal Commission's proposals on the future role and structure of this House, and will act on them. That is, we agree that the Second Chamber should clearly be subordinate, largely nominated but with a minority elected element and with a particular responsibility to represent the regions. We agree there should be a statutory appointments commission ...<ref>House of Lords Hansard, cols 912 & 915</ref>

On 4 May 2000 the Prime Minister announced the membership of a non-statutory Appointments Commission; In the debate in the Commons on 19 June 2000 the Government announced the establishment of a Joint Committee of both Parliaments to "consider the Royal Commission's work"<ref>House of Commons Hansard, col. 55</ref>. But in a written reply on 6 March the Government stated there was little prospect of a Joint Committee being established in the present Parliament due to a failure of cross-party discussions. On 26 April 2001 the Queen confirmed her intention to create 15 new non party-political members of the House of Lords termed "People's Peers". In the May 2001 general election, all three main parties included statements on House of Lords reform in their manifestos.

[edit] White paper and first consultation

On 7 November 2001, the government launched a white paper and consultation stating:

A credible and effective second chamber is vital to the health of Britain's democracy... The Government is determined to proceed with this wider reform of the House of Lords. The Royal Commission offered an excellent way forward and the Government has a clear electoral mandate to undertake it. Our mission is to equip the British people with a Parliament and a constitution fit for the 21st century. A reformed second chamber has an indispensable role to play, and this White Paper prepares the way for its introduction. <Ref name="WhitePaper">White Paper & Consultation, The House of Lords Completing the Reform, Nov 2001 </ref>

In the white paper, although the government said it "stongly endorsed" the Royal Commission's views, it listed its own proposals:<Ref name="WhitePaper"/>:

  • The remaining 92 Hereditary Peers were to be removed, the number capped after 10 years at 600 and 120 members to be elected to represent the nations and the regions.
  • It was to include a significant minority of independent members; Its political membership should be broadly representative of the main parties' relative voting strengths as reflected in the previous General Election; Membership was to be separated from the peerage which would continue as a honour; There should be increased representation of women and those from ethnic minority backgrounds;No group in society should in future have privileged hereditary access to the House; *The House of Lords would remain subject to the pre-eminence of the House of Commons in discharging its functions; Its principal function should continue to be to consider and revise legislation; to scrutinise the executive; and to debate and report on public issues;
  • The statutory Appointments Commission would manage the balance and size of the House appoint the independent members, and to assure the integrity of those nominated by political parties.
First public consulation

The white paper invited comments from interested parties stating the government intending to introduce legislation "incorporating decisions on the issues raised in the consultation"<ref name="WhitePaper" /> and listed the following as the main points of consultation:

  • The overall balance between, elected, nominated and ex officio members, and the balance between political and independent members;
  • Whether elections to the Lords should be linked to General Elections, those for the European Parliament, or over time linked to those from devolved and regional bodies within the UK;
  • The length of term for elected members;
  • The term of appointment;
  • What grounds should lead to statutory expulsion from the House;
  • Should there be a change from an expenses-based system of remuneration.

The result was that an unprecended[citation needed] 1101 submissions were made to the consultation and both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties published their own proposals during the consulation in January 2002. In May 2002, the Government published a statistical analysis. The Government proposed to establish a Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform to try and take matters forward an achieve a consensus<ref>HC Hansard 12 May 2002, cols. 516-533</ref><ref>HL Hansard 12 May 2002, cols. 12-23</ref>

[edit] Votes

On 11 December 2002 the Joint Committee published its first report<ref>House of Lords Refrom: First Report (HL 17, 2002-03)</ref> which set out "an inclusive range of seven options for the composition of a reformed House of Lords". In January 2003, the House of Lords and Commons debated the report. The debate in the Lords was dominated by contributors arguing for a fully appointed House so much so that Lord Irvine stated:

Plainly, the dominant view of this House expressed over the past two days is in favour of an all-appointed House<ref>HL Hansard, 22 January 2003, Col. 831</ref>

And, on 29 January 2003 Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, added his own support to a fully appointed House by arguing against the creation of a hybrid House.<ref>HC Hansard, 29 January 2003, cols. 877-78</ref> On 4 February 2003, the Commons and House of Lords voted on the seven options propoosed by the joint committe and the Commons also voted on an amendment to abolish the upper House completely:

Results of Parliamentary Votes 4 February 2003
Option Lords Commons
Elected Appointed For Against For Against
0% 100% 335 110 245 323
20% 80% 39 375 - -
40% 60% 60 358 - -
50% 50% 84 322 - -
60% 40% 91 317 253 316
80% 20% 93 338 281 284
100% 0% 106 329 272 289
Abolishment - - 172 390

After this series of votes where the Commons failed to back a single opotion and the Lords only a fully appointed House, Robin Cook the leader of the Commons said:

We should go home and sleep on this interesting position. That is the most sensible thing that anyone can say in the circumstances. As the right honourable Gentleman knows, the next stage in the process is for the Joint Committee to consider the votes in both Houses. Heaven help the members of the Committee, because they will need it.<ref>HC Hansard, 4 February 2003, col. 243</ref>

With widely differing views in the Joint Committee, its report on 9 May 2003 effectively passed the initiative back to the Government. But nine members of the Joint Committee issued a statement coinciding with the publication which stated:

Since the House of Commons rejected the option of a fully appointed Second Chamber by a large majority on 4th February it would be absurd and unacceptable to introduce legislation which would have that effect. Simply evicting the hereditary peers, and placing the appointmetns process on a statutory basis, would result in that soundly rejected option. Those who argue that the Commons must remain predominant - including Ministers - should surely respect the outcome of that vote by MPs.<ref>Statement inlcuded in Liberal Democrat press release: 'Don't Tinker with the Lords', 9 May 2003</ref>

Creation of Department for Constitutional Affairs In June 2003, Tony Blair announced the creation of a new department to oversee constitutional change with Lord Falconer as its first Secretary of State. The department was tasked with:

  • Establishment of an independent Judicial Appointments Commission.
  • Creation of a new Supreme Court to replace the existing system of Law Lords operating as a committee of the House of Lords.
  • Reform of the Speakership of the House of Lords.
  • New arrangements for the conduct of Scottish and Welsh business.

When in 2003 Lord Falconer signalled the governments preference for an all appointed House of Lords, three members of the Liberal Democrats issued a statement:

We, together with other members of the committee, issued a statement at the same time stating our belief that the committee could not continue to act in the absence of an indication of the government's preferred route to achieve its manifesto commitment to a more representative and democratic House of Lords." Ministers responded saying "We cannot accept the removal of the remaining hereditary peers on its own, but only as part of much wider measures of reform to create a democratic and accountable second chamber.... We therefore see no role which the joint committee can usefully play in achieving the reformed House of Lords which we seek.<ref>bbc.co.uk</ref>

[edit] Second public consultation

In September 2003, the Department of Constitutional Affairs issued Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for the House of Lords, which gave as its main proposals:

  • A fully Appointed House of Lords
  • Removal of the remaining 92 Hereditary Peers
  • Establishment of a statutory independent Appointments Commission accountable to Parliament which would determine numbers and timings of appointments, select independent members of the House of oversee party nominations

The paper also started a second consultation, on the Appointments Commission for the House of Lords requesting submissions on how the Appointments Commission itself would be appointed, even though no other alternatives to an appointed Commission had been considered. Reaction to the paper was hostile: for example, Lord Goodhart, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson on Constitutional Affairs, said "the overwhelming reaction I have is a feeling of contempt and betrayal."<ref>HL Hansard, 18 September 2003</ref> On 18 March 2004 (before the statistical analysis had been published), the BBC reported<ref>BBC News, 'Blair puts Lords reform on hold' 19 March 2004</ref> that the government would not proceed with legislation to enact the proposals in the consultation. Although this suggested a lack of support for their proposals from the consultation, when the statistical analysis was published on 22 April 2004 the report stated that on the main issue (2a):

"87 percent of respondents dealing with issue 2 (a) were in favour of a Commission composed of representatives of the three main political parties and the cross-benchers and a number of independently appointed members." <ref>2nd Consultation report[citation needed]</ref>

With such an apparently high level of support, it is unclear why the government choose not to proceed. The only insight available is unofficial reports putting the actual level of support at closer to third.

Moreover, as the government published most of the responses to both consultations, it is possible to see that many of these responses were highly critical of both the Government's proposal and the consultation process; some even went on to complain that the UK government breached its own code of conduct for consultations by failing to mention many of the new ideas arising from both consultations.

In the 2005 general election, all three parties included statements on reform of the House of Lords in their manifestos with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats promising "substantially"/"predominantly" elected Chambers. In December 2005, the Constitution Unit, part of the University College of London's School of Public Policy, released research findings showing "surprising levels of support from MPs and the public for the Lords to vote down government proposals":

Despite the unelected basis of the Lords these results make clear that it enjoys support from MPs and the general public to block policies that are perceived as unpopular. Far from clashing with the Commons it may even inflict government defeats with the silent approval of Labour MPs. Whilst government may wish to tame the powers of the Lords, these results suggest that voters are really quite happy with things as they are."<ref>Constitution Unit press release, 'Lords should block government bills, say public and MPs', 12 December 2005</ref>

[edit] 2006 discussions

In March 2006, the House of Lords reform was again under discussion. This new interest resulted from the Cash for Peerages affair together with recent attempts by the Lords to block, water down (or add safeguards to, according to viewpoint), recent controversial legislation such as the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Hunting Act 2004, Terrorism Bill 2005, the Identity Cards Bill 2005, and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Following the failure of the previous public consultations, to endorse the Governments proposals for reform, in April 2006, Baroness Amos announced the government would now "consult privately" with the other main political parties on the membership of the House<ref>HL Hansard, 25 April 2006, cols 91-92</ref>.

In the UK Cabinet reshuffle, May 2006 on 5 May 2006, governmental responsibility for this topic was transferred from Lord Falconer the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor to (Jack Straw) the Leader of the House of Commons.

Jack Straw now faced an enormous challenge. Although seen as very modest reforms, the removal of most Hereditary Peers and rebalancing of the political make up of the House (Labour Peers now formed the largest political party) were making the House increasingly confident of its own legitimacy. Paradoxically, far from making the Lords more submissive, more and more this labour dominated House of Lords was willing to be assertive in its actions and confront the government<ref>Dr Meg Russell & Maria Sciara, The House of Lords in 2005: A more representative and more assertive chamber</ref>.

[edit] Current status

In a paper [1] leaked on 21 October it was suggested that there would be 450 Lords, sitting for no more than three parliamentary terms and Peers would be paid trebling the cost. The paper suggested that half the members would be elected and half appointed. The precise form of elections or appointment are still uncertain however even at this stage it appears that the general public will be excluded from the appointments panel. On 15 November 2006 the Queen's speach again announced the intention of bringing forward legislation, but did not supply more details.

Although the nature of any membership changes is currently unclear, it has been reported that the Government are considering removing the ability of the Lords to delay legislation that arises as a result of manifesto commitments, and reducing their ability to delay other legislation to a period of 60 days [2].

[edit] The debate

There are three main issues which need to be resolved for a comprehensive reform:

  1. Should Parliament be bicameral or unicameral?
    Most Westminster type Parliaments are bicameral but not all. The Parliament of New Zealand for example has had only one House since the Legislative Council was abolished in 1951.
  2. If there is to be a second chamber what powers should it have?
    The Senates of Canada and Australia, like the pre-1911 House of Lords, have essentially equal legislative powers with the lower houses. More recent Commonwealth of Nations constitutions have given lesser powers to such bodies.
  3. If there is to be a second chamber what should its composition be and how should the members be chosen?
    There are many different possibilities. The original Greek Democracy had an upper chamber chosen by lot. The Canadian Senate is appointed. The Senate of Australia is elected by proportional representation within each State and Territory. The former Senate of Northern Ireland was indirectly elected by the members of the Northern Ireland House of Commons, with the Lord Mayor of Belfast and Mayor of Londonderry as ex-officio members. There are also new possibilities such as having a citizen's jury to appoint the members.

Most British politicians over the past century have valued the existence of a second chamber and have agreed that it should not be as powerful as the House of Commons. However, there has been little agreement about the precise powers and none about the issue of composition.

[edit] The relationship between the Commons and Lords

In a bicameral parliamentary system, the Upper and Lower chamber need to work together to be effective. Reform of the House of Lords therefore raises questions about the respective roles of the House of Lords and House of Commons. As the UK does not have a written constitution, the relationship has developed through a variety of means including legislation, information agreements and custom and practice.

For more information see Lords Reform - Roles

[edit] Aims of the reform

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[edit] Other issues

  • At present, the Scottish Parliament has devolved powers over areas like Health and Education. The Scottish Parliament does not have an upper chamber but instead MSPs scrutinise legislation in a committee system. This means that, for example, legislation on English health and education is subject to the House of Lords, whilst Scottish legislation is not.
  • There are some concerns that a reformed upper house may be "a feeder body" into the lower house (Charlotte Atkins MP) as has occurred in other countries with bicameral parliaments. Others are concerned that the upper house may be filled by MPs who lose their seats. Various proposals have been put forward to prevent this happening, including a five-year ban on former members of the Lords seeking election to the Commons.
  • The House of Lords has a judicial function, which will be clearly affected by the reform process, although there are already plans for a separate Supreme Court.

[edit] The range of options

"Central to the future House of Lords is its composition. For the Lords to act with legitimacy as an effective and balanced second chamber, it must have the right form to deliver the range of roles and functions it needs"<ref name="ModernisingParliament" >Modernising Parliament, Reforming the House of Lords, HMSO, December 1998</ref>. With 1101 submissions to the first consultation, several hundred to the second and many articles in the newspapers and various discussions, there were many different views on how to modernise the House of Lords. It is only possible to give a broad outline of the many different proposals and even then only those where the proposals were mentioned by a number of respondents.

Proposals are listed alphabetically

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[edit] Abolition

Many legislatures, such as the parliaments of Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand (and within the UK, the Scottish Parliament) are unicameral, and do not have an upper house. Instead, scrutiny is carried out by parliamentary committees. A substantial minority of MPs voted for the outright abolition of the upper house in 2003, and it was Labour party policy until the late 1980s.

[edit] Allotment/sortition

Allotment, or selection by lot, was the form of selection used in the first democracies in Ancient Greece, and is now used in Anglo Saxon legal system to select juries. Advocates maintain it is inherently democratic. Opposition is either based on the practical need for some expertise amongst members of the upper chamber or a belief that "Democracy means an elected second chamber"<ref name="DemocIsElect">Benn, T., Democracy means an elected second chamber, SCGN December 1999 no.149 </ref>. Most proposals suggest some form of Citizen's Assembly allotted from all voters at random, but there is considerable variation.

[edit] Appointment

Although no one seriously argued an appointed Upper House was itself democratic, the reason that the UK almost uniquely (except the Canadian Senate) still retained an appointed House of Lords in 1997 was that, although undemocratic, it was widely accepted that it worked. In particular the large number of cross bench peers would be impossible to achieve in most electoral systems. To set against the huge problem of democratic legitimacy is the benefits of an appointed House: it can include those with skills, experience and expertise not normally found in elected politicians, and membership for life gives a longer-term perspective which can be missing in an elected house. The main issues are<ref name="ModernisingParliament" />:

  • Achieving a range of representation, bringing in those with skills and experience, allowing ex officio members and ensuring a continuity of membership
  • Maintaining the status and independence of the Lords without endangering the supremacy of the Commons
  • Maintaining the low cost of the present House

[edit] Combination

By far the most commonly suggested proposal for reform amongst politicians is a combination of an elected and appointed House; this was the original proposal recommended by the Wakeham Report. Proponents suggest a combination makes an appointed House more democratic without being so democratic it challenges the primacy of the commons and it allows the House to keep those with skills and experience. Opponents say that the two types of members will inevitably conflict, voting for part of the House will have little support amongst an already sceptical electorate, and the lack of synergy will make it worse than either a fully elected or fully appointed house. The main variation focus of discussion is exact percentage of those elected and appointed:

[edit] Democratic appointments

Under this proposal, a citizen's jury would appoint some or all members of the chamber. This combines elements of elections, allotment and indirect appointments; the appointment being said to be democratic because the jury democratic being selected by allotment which was considered the most democratic form of selection in the original Athenian democracy.<ref>"I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected is oligarchic," (Aristotle Politics)</ref> Supporters claim that it "retains the best aspects of the present house and makes the system of selection more democratic in nature"<ref name="allot" />. It is a minority "grass roots option" <ref name="allot">Http://www.allot.org.uk</ref> not seen before the second consultation where it was supported by around 10% of submissions.

[edit] Election

Many countries have directly elected Upper Chambers but they try to make their electoral systems for the second chamber as distinct as possible from the first chamber by holding elections on a different cycle or electing only a proportion of members on each occasion<ref name="ModernisingParliament" />. Although politicians such as Tony Benn maintain that elections are necessary to be democratic: "Democracy means an elected second chamber"<ref name="DemocIsElect" />, in practice, most electoral systems are a combination of elections and appointments: candidates are first appointed by political parties and then elected by the people. Moreover, few seriously maintain that in a democracy all institutions including judges and juries should be elected, or, for example, that the election of the Hereditary peers makes them democratic.

According to the Government report, the advantages of an elected Upper House are<ref name="ModernisingParliament" />:

  • Legitimacy: There can be no doubt about the democratic mandate of an elected body.
  • Status of members: Membership of the second chamber would be seen as a job with specific and important duties attached.
  • Representation: All parts of the country and all shades of political opinion could be represented.
  • Age: An elected House is likely to have more younger people in it than a nominated one.
  • Entrenched bicameralism: It is an unequivocal sign the Government was committed to a bicameral legislature.

The main disadvantages are:

  • Conflict with the House of Commons: It may challenge the supremacy of the Commons on the strength of its own electoral mandate.
  • Loss of independents and ex officio membership: It would be virtually impossible to retain any independent, non-party element in the House.
  • Transitional difficulties: The transition to a fully elected House would be most disruptive.
  • Higher costs: Elections, proper salaries and research facilities would considerably increase the costs.

Many submissions from the public rejected the notion that an elected Upper House would be democratic, basing their assertion on the model of the Athenian democracy which did not elect either the Upper House or assembly. (The Athenian Upper House was a court allotted from all citizens, any citizen was able to attend the assembly)

The main variation between proposals for an elected Upper House is the form of election:

[edit] Hereditary

A large number of hereditary peers were crossbenchers with a wide range of interests outside politics - a valuable asset to Parliament. A hereditary right, which passes across the generations, may have the benefit of encouraging a longer-term perspective but this is at the expense of creating a divisive society. Moreover, in practice, the hereditary Peers had a natural bias on many issues (e.g., their support for the Conservative Party). There are now few who support this form of selection.

[edit] Indirect election/appointment

About 30% of overseas second chambers are elected by indirect methods, including France, the Netherlands and South Africa. The electoral college often consists of members of local authorities or regional assemblies, and may include members of the primary chamber. There are various proposals:

  • Elections by Regional Development Agencies and voluntary regional chambers, the London Assembly would "would demonstrate a direct connection between these other bodies and the central institutions at Westminster" and because "many of these bodies had themselves been elected... it could therefore reinforce the democratic nature of an otherwise nominated House"<ref name="ModernisingParliament" />
  • A variety of institutions such as the Royal Society and charities, are able to elect or appoint a member. Other groups could include the TUC, the GMC, and the Law Society. This would also involve keeping the Law Lords and Lords Spiritual.
  • It has also been suggested that leaders of local councils (who have already been elected to their position) sit in the House of Lords.

[edit] Secondary mandate

A system proposed by musician and activist Billy Bragg whereby the share of each party's votes at each general election is aggregated and each party is allocated a number of places proportionately using a closed list system[3]. Each elector would have one vote which would both determine both their local MP and the composition of the Upper House.

The advantages of this system are claimed to be that: there would be only one election campaign to fund, it does not waste votes because votes for minority parties will count in the Upper House and so it should improve voter turnout, and as the upper house has no direct vote it has no separate mandate and so the Commons will remain supreme. Critics however see a single vote as a choice between voting for an MP or voting for the upper house; if large numbers choose to vote for the upper house instead of their MP it would undermine the mandate of the Commons and create a confused election (for example MPs might be ousted by a poor performance of their party in the Upper House and vica versa).

[edit] References

<references />

[edit] Further reading

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

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