Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
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| Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife<tr style="text-align: center;"><td colspan="2">Image:Seal of the United States Supreme Court.png Supreme Court of the United States</td></tr> | ||||||
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| Argued December 3, 1991 Decided June 12, 1992 | ||||||
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| Holding | ||||||
| Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring suit under the Endangered Species Act, because the threat of a species' extinction alone did not established an individual and nonspeculative private injury. Eighth Circuit reversed. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
| Chief Justice: William Rehnquist Associate Justices: Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas | ||||||
| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority by: Scalia (parts I, II, III-A, IV) Joined by: Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas Concurrence by: Scalia (part III-B) Joined by: Rehnquist, White, Thomas Concurrence by: Kennedy Joined by: Souter Concurrence by: Stevens Dissent by: Blackmun Joined by: O'Connor <tr style="text-align: center; background: #6699FF;"><th colspan="2">Laws applied</tr></th><td>U.S. Const. art. III; (§ 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973)</td> |
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, , was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a group of wildlife conservation and other environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge regulations jointly issued by the U.S. Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, regarding the geographic area to which a particular section of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 applied.
The Court made clear that plaintiffs must suffer a concrete, imminent, discernible injury -- not a conjectural or hypothetical one -- to be able to bring suit in federal court. [I]n effect, made it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge the actions of a government agency when the actions don't directly affect them. [1]

