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The Morgenthau Plan was a plan for the occupation of Germany after the Second World War that advocated harsh measures that would ensure that Germany could never wage war again. This was to be achieved in three steps.

• Germany was to be partitioned into two independent states.
• Germany's main centres of mining and industry, including the Saar area, the Ruhr area and Upper Silesia were to be Internationalised or annexed by neighbouring nations.
• All heavy industry was to be dismantled or otherwise destroyed.

The plan was proposed by American Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

A toned down version of the plan, limited to turning Germany into "a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character", and lacking the requirement for the destruction of the Ruhr mines, was signed by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944.

President Roosevelt then gradually pulled back from this extreme position, but had at the time of his death not made up his mind as to the future of Germany. With the death of the president the plan itself never took effect, but as its ideas permeated much of American thinking and planning, especially in secretary Morgenthau's Treasury and the War Department, it did lead to a number of offshoots. Most notable amongst these offshoots are

• Potsdam Conference,
• Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (April 1945 – July 1947) ,
• The industrial plans for Germany. (Level of industry agreements)

JCS 1067 explicitly prohibited U.S. occupation authorities from providing any economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind to the German people, not even to maintain the current economic levels. U.S. occupation efforts were to be focused on denazification and the destruction of heavy industry war-production capability.

In January 1946 the Allied Control Council set the foundation of the future German economy by putting a cap on German steel production, the maximum allowed was set at about 25% of the prewar production level.<ref>"Cornerstone of Steel", Time Magazine, January 21, 1946</ref> Steel plants thus made redundant were dismantled.

Also as a consequence of the Potsdam conference, the occupation forces of all nations were obliged to ensure that German standards of living were lowered to the level of its European neighbours with which it had been at war with, France in particular.

Germany was to be reduced to the standard of life it had known at the height of the Great depression (1932). <ref>Cost of Defeat, Time Magazine, April 8, 1946</ref>

The first "level of industry" plan, signed in 1946, stated that German heavy industry was to be lowered to 50% of its 1938 levels by the destruction of 1,500 manufacturing plants<ref>Henry C. Wallich. Mainsprings of the German Revival (1955) pg. 348.</ref>

The problems brought on by the execution of these types of policies were eventually apparent to most U.S. officials in Germany. Germany had long been the industrial giant of Europe, and its poverty held back the general European recovery. The continued scarcity in Germany also led to considerable expenses for the occupying powers, which were obligated to try and make up the most important shortfalls through the GARIOA program (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas).

In view of the continued poverty and famine in Europe, and with the onset of the Cold War which made it important not to lose all of Germany to the communists, it was apparent by 1947 that a change of policy was required.

The change was heralded by Restatement of Policy on Germany, a famous speech by James F. Byrnes, then United States Secretary of State, held in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future U.S. policy as it repudiated the Morgenthau Plan economic policies and with its message of change to a policy of economic reconstruction gave the Germans hope for the future. Herbert Hoover's situation reports from 1947, as well as A Report on Germany also served to help change occupation policy.

The Western powers worst fear by now was that the poverty and hunger would drive the Germans to Communism. General Lucius Clay stated "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand".

The most notable example of this change of policy was a plan established by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, the "European Recovery Program", better known as the Marshall Plan, which in the form of loans instead of the free aid received by other recipients eventually was extended to also include the newly formed West Germany in 1949.

The Marshall Plan … is not a philanthropic enterprise … It is based on our views of the requirements of American security … This is the only peaceful avenue now open to us which may answer the communist challenge to our way of life and our national security." (Allen W. Dulles, The Marshall Plan) <ref>"Marshall Plan 1947–1997, A German View" by Susan Stern</ref>

Contents 1 Text of the Morgenthau Plan 2 Roosevelt's support for the plan 3 Churchill's support for the plan 4 Rejection of the plan 5 Wartime Consequences 6 Suggested 1944 post-surrender program for Germany 7 JCS 1067 8 Implementation 9 Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan 10 Notes 11 Further reading 11.1 Primary sources 12 External links 12.1 Document Collections 12.2 Documents 12.3 Images 12.4 Interviews 12.5 Time Magazine articles 13 See also

[edit] Text of the Morgenthau Plan

At a conference between the President and Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical, and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge. This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primary agricultural and pastoral in its character. <ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, (Washington, 1967) volume 1, pp. 620–621</ref>

Prime Minister Winston Churchill cabled news of the agreement to Clement Attlee, his deputy in London, and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt advised the Secretaries of State and War of his approval in a memo dated September 15, 1944.

[edit] Roosevelt's support for the plan

Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau Jr. convinced Roosevelt to write to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson saying that a U.S. occupation policy which anticipated that "Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium" was excessively lenient. A better policy would have the Germans "fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens" so "they will remember that experience the rest of their lives." (Cordell Hull, Memories, (New York: 1948) volume II, pp. 1602–3). Morgenthau was the only Cabinet member invited to participate in the Quebec Conference during which the Plan was agreed to.

The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on a charge of passing US Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who died of a heart attack shortly after testifying before the House (John Morton Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941 - 1945" (Boston, 1967) p. 338).

Roosevelt's motivations for agreeing to Morgenthau's proposal may be attributed to his desire to be on good terms with Stalin and to a personal conviction that Germany must be treated harshly. In an August 26, 1944 letter to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Roosevelt wrote that "There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again — and those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude. Most decidedly I belong to the latter school, for though I am not bloodthirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war." (The Roosevelt Letters, volume III: 1928–1945, London, 1952). Roosevelt is also quoted as saying to Morgenthau that "We have got to be tough with the Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past" (Blum, p. 342). At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, Stalin had proposed that at least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 German officers should be murdered. Roosevelt's son, Elliot, enthusiastically agreed. The President remarked that perhaps 49,000 should be enough (US Department of State, The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington: 1961) p. 602). When Churchill became enraged at these comments, Stalin quickly assured him that they were joking (Michael Beschloss, "The Conquerors"). Roosevelt was presumably joking, but at the Yalta Conference the President said that he was feeling "very much more bloodthirsty towards Germany" than earlier and indicated that he hoped Stalin would again "propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German army" (US Department of State, The Yalta Conference, 1945 (Washington: 1961), Roosevelt–Stalin Meeting, February 4 1945, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 566–573).

The Morgenthau plan did face at least some mild level of opposition in Roosevelt's government, as evidenced by this excerpt of a note to the president from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, dated September 5, 1944. [1]

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse. Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty.

[edit] Churchill's support for the plan

Churchill was not inclined to support the proposal, saying "England would be chained to a dead body". Roosevelt reminded Churchill of Stalin's comments at the Tehran Conference, and asked "Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned in the manufacture of armament." (Memorandum by Harry Dexter White for the Secretary of the Treasury, September 25 1944, Memorandum by the Deputy Directory of the Office of European Affairs for the Secretary of State, September 20 1944). The meeting broke up on Churchill's disagreement but Roosevelt suggested that Morgenthau and White continue to discuss with Lord Cherwell, Churchill's personal assistant.

Lord Cherwell has been described as having "an almost pathological hatred for Nazi Germany, and an almost medieval desire for revenge was a part of his character" (John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, "The Semblance of Peace" (London: 1972), p. 179). Morgenthau is quoted as saying to his staff that "I can't overemphasize how helpful Lord Cherwell was because he could advise how to handle Churchill" (Blum, p. 373). In any case, Cherwell was able to persuade Churchill to change his mind. Churchill later said that "At first I was violently opposed to the idea. But the President and Mr Morgenthau — from whom we had much to ask — were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it" (Churchill, "The Tide of Victory", (London: 1954), pp. 138–139).

Some have read into the clause "from whom we had much to ask" that Churchill was bought off, and note a September 15 memo from Roosevelt to Hull stating that "Morgenthau has presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totalling six and half billion dollars." Hull's comment on this was that "this might suggest to some the quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr Churchill's adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany" (Hull, "Memoirs", pp. 1613–4).

Harry Dexter White, regarded by many as the principal author of the plan, was after his death exposed as a Soviet agent. This has prompted some, including John Dietrich in The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy, to draw the conclusion that the real purpose of the plan was to further communist expansion in Central and Western Europe after the war.

At Quebec White made sure that Lord Cherwell understood that economic aid to Britain was dependent on British approval of the plan. During the signing of the plan, which coinsided with the signing of a loan agreement, President Roosevelt proposed that they sign the plan first. This prompted Churchil to exclaim: "What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Fala?" (<ref>Investigations: One Man's Greed, Time Magazine, November 23, 1953</ref>)

An excerpt from the minutes of the Quebec meeting, taken down by George M. Elsey Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, and duty officer, White House Map Room, 1941–46, reads as follows:

And the President and the Prime Minister agreed on a policy towards Germany. This program for eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character. The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement on this program. [2]

[edit] Rejection of the plan

Anthony Eden expressed his strong opposition to the plan and, with the support of some others, was able to get the Morgenthau Plan set aside in Britain. In the US, Hull argued that nothing would be left to Germany but land and only 60% of the Germans could live off the land, meaning 40% of the population would die. Stimson expressed his opposition even more forcefully to Roosevelt. According to Stimson, the President grinned and "looked naughty", before finally saying that he just wanted to help Britain get a share of the Ruhr and denied that he intended to deindustrialize Germany. Stimson replied, "Mr President, I don't like you to dissemble to me" and read back to Roosevelt what he had signed. Struck by this, Roosevelt said he had "no idea how he could have initialled this" (Elting E. Morrison quoting Stimson's October 3 1944 diary, "Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson" (Boston, 1960) p. 609).

[edit] Wartime Consequences

Drew Pearson publicized the plan on September 21, although Pearson himself was sympathetic to it. More critical stories in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal quickly followed. Joseph Goebbels' propaganda machine made extensive use of the Morgenthau Plan, and General George Marshall complained to Morgenthau that German resistance had strengthened. Lt Col John Boettiger said the Morgenthau Plan was "worth thirty divisions to the Germans" (Report on the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 41ff). On December 11, 1944 President Roosevelt was given a translated synopsis of a recent article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

So far, the Allies have not offered the opposition any serious encouragement. On the contrary, they have again and again welded together the people and the Nazis by statements published, either out of indifference or with a purpose. To take a recent example, the Morgenthau plan gave Dr. Goebbels the best possible chance. He was able to prove to his countrymen, in black and white, that the enemy planned the enslavement of Germany. The conviction that Germany had nothing to expect from defeat but oppression and exploitation still prevails, and that accounts for the fact that the Germans continue to fight. It is not a question of a regime, but of the homeland itself, and to save that, every German is bound to obey the call, whether he be Nazi or member of the opposition. [3]

[edit] Suggested 1944 post-surrender program for Germany

Excerpts from Post-Surrender Program for Germany, Roosevelt Presidential Library Created sometime between January 1944 and September 1944 and presumably the original Morgenthau plan.

1. Demilitarization of Germany. 

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. Partitioning of Germany. 

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the USSR and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the attached map, (Appendix A).

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

(d) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr Area. 

(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached map, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German territory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the cauldron of wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled and removed from the area or completely destroyed. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.

It is anticipated that the stripping of this area would be accomplished in three stages:

(i) The military forces immediately upon entry into the area shal destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed.

(ii) Removal of plants and equipment by members of the United Nations as restitution and reparation (Paragraph 4).

(iii) All plants and equipment not removed within a stated period of time, say 6 months, will be completely destroyed or reduced to scrap and allocated to the United Nations.

(b) All people within the area should be made to understand that this area will not again be allowed to become an industrial area. Accordingly, all people and their families within the area having special skills or technical training should be encouraged to migrate permanently from the area and should be as widely dispersed as possible.

(c) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objectives.

4. Restitution and Reparation. 

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatso-ever outside of Germany.

[edit] JCS 1067

In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany", was replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stressed that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." <ref>Pas de Pagaille! Time Magazine, Jul. 28, 1947.</ref>

Although the Morgenthau Plan per se was effectively shelved, Morgenthau was nonetheless able to wield considerable influence over Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. JCS 1067 was a basis for US Occupation policy until July 1947, and like the Morgenthau Plan, was intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector.

Lewis Douglas, chief advisor to General Lucius Clay, US High Commissioner, denounced the directive saying, "This thing was assembled by economic idiots. It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can in a continent that is desperately short of everything" <ref>(Robert Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors", (London: 1964) p. 251).</ref>.

In his 1950 book Decision in Germany, Clay wrote, "It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production"<ref> Ibid p. 18</ref>. Douglas went to Washington in the hopes of having the directive revised but was unable to do so.

On March 20, 1945 President Roosevelt was warned that the JCS 1067 was not workable: it would let the Germans "stew in their own juice". Roosevelt's response was "Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!". Asked if he wanted the German people to starve, he replied, "Why not?".<ref>Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945, pg. 196.</ref>

On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067. Morgenthau told his staff that it was a big day for the Treasury, and that he hoped that "someone doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan."<ref>Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945, pg. 233.</ref>

E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Assistant Chief, 1945–47, and Associate Chief, 1947–48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department of State summed it up as follows: [4]

As early as the Quebec Conference he [the President] had bought Secretary [Henry J.] Morgenthau's ideas: The Morgenthau Plan — to do everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme position. Yet those ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary [James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in [September of] 1946. They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067. They also affected Roosevelt's thinking on the question of whether to split up Germany.

The US Senate's Judiciary Committee asserted: "During the first two years of the Allied occupation the Treasury program of industrial dismantlement was vigorously pursued by American officials."<ref>John Dietrich. The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (2002) pg. 85.</ref>

Vladimir Petrov, an expert on the financial aspects of the occupation, wrote: "By forbidding the American Army to maintain price, wage, and market controls, it (JCS 1067) literally decreed, as a State Department official put it, economic chaos."<ref>John Dietrich, pg. 85.</ref>

In 1947 the U.S. Congress warned that the continuation of the present policies

…can only mean one of two things, (a) That a considerable part of the German population must be "liquidated" through diseases, malnutrition, and slow starvation for a period of years to come, with the resultant dangers to the rest of Europe from pestilence and the spread of plagues that know no boundaries; or (b) the continuation both of large occupying forces to hold down "unrest" and the affording of relief mainly drawn from the United States to prevent actual starvation.<ref>John Dietrich, pg. 99.</ref>

Conditions in Germany reached their lowest point in 1947. Living conditions were considered worse in 1947 than in 1945 or 1946. At an average ration of 1040 calories a day malnutrition was at its worst stage in post-war Germany. Herbert Hoover asserted that that ration was hardly more than the ration that caused thousands in the Nazi concentration camps to die from starvation.<ref>John Dietrich, pg. 108.</ref>

Vladimir Petrov concluded: "The victorious Allies … delayed by several years the economic reconstruction of the war torn continent, a reconstruction which subsequently cost the US billions of dollars."<ref>John Dietrich, pg. 88.</ref>

In view of increased concerns by General Lucius D. Clay and the Joint Chief of Staff over communist influence in Germany, as well as of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it was dependent, in the summer of 1947 Secretary of State General George Marshall, citing "national security grounds" was finally able to convince President Harry S. Truman to remove JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779.<ref>The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, by Ray Salvatore Jennings May 2003, Peaceworks No. 49, United States Institute of Peace pg. 15</ref> JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.

With the change of occupation policy Germany eventually made an impressive recovery, later known as the Wirtschaftswunder.

[edit] Implementation

Some of the Morgenthau Plan was implemented, and some came very close to being implemented. The Morgenthau Plan spawned the JCS-1067[5], which contained the ideas of making Germany a "Pastoral State". This concept's name was later changed to become "level of industry", where Germany's production was to be severely limited but not completely eliminated. No new locomotives were to be built until 1949, most industries were to have their production halved. Automobile production was to be set at 10% of its [pre-war] 1936 level, etc.[6]

On February 2, 1946, a dispatch from Berlin reported:

Some progress has been made in converting Germany to an agricultural and light industry economy, said Brigadier General William H. Draper, Jr., chief of the American Economics Division, who emphasized that there was general agreement on that plan. He explained that Germany’s future industrial and economic pattern was being drawn for a population of 66,500,000. On that basis, he said, the nation will need large imports of food and raw materials to maintain a minimum standard of living. General agreement, he continued, had been reached on the types of German exports — coal, coke, electrical equipment, leather goods, beer, wines, spirits, toys, musical instruments, textiles and apparel — to take the place of the heavy industrial products which formed most of Germany's pre-war exports. <ref>James Stewart Martin. All Honorable Men (1950) pg. 191.</ref>

Morgenthau had written a book outlining the full Morgenthau Plan, Germany is Our Problem. In November 1945 General Eisenhower, Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone, approved the distribution of one thousand free copies of the book to American military officials in Germany.<ref>John Dietrich. The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (2002) pg. 27.</ref>

By February 28, 1947 it was estimated that 4,160,000 German former prisoners of war, by General Eisenhower relabeled as Disarmed Enemy Forces in order to negate the Geneva Convention, were used as forced labor in work camps outside Germany: 3,000,000 in Russia, 750,000 in France, 400,000 in Britain and 10,000 in Belgium. [7] Meanwhile in Germany large parts of the population were starving at a time when the "nutritional condition in those [neighbouring] countries is nearly pre-war normal". [8] (See also The U.S. and the refusal to feed German civilians after the war)

All armaments plants, included some that could have been converted to civilian operation, were dismantled or destroyed. A large proportion of operational civilian plants were dismantled and transported to the victorious nations, mainly France and Russia.

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As late as March 1947 there were still active plans to let France annex the Ruhr just as eastern Prussia and Silesia had been annexed by Russia and Poland, or at a minimum remove it from Germany.

{{{1}}}

The Saar, another important source of coal and industry for Germany, was likewise to be lost by the Germans. It was cut out from Germany and its resources put under French control. In 1955, the French, under pressure from West Germany and her newfound allies, held a plebiscite in the Saar Protectorate on the question of reunification or independence. Reunification won overwhelmingly, and on January 1, 1957, Saarland rejoined West Germany.

As Germany was allowed no airplane production nor any shipbuilding capacity to supply a merchant navy, all facilities of this type were destroyed over a period of several years. A typical example of this activity by the allies was the Bloehm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg, where explosive demolition was still taking place as late as 1949. Everything that could not be dismantled was blown up or otherwise destroyed. A small-scale attempt to revive the company in 1948 ended with the owners and a number of employees being thrown in jail by the British. It was not until 1953 that the situation gradually started to improve for the Bloehm & Voss, thanks in part to repeated pleas by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to the Allied High Commissioners.<ref>ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, Press release, 2002-04-02 125 years Blohm + Voss</ref>

Over a period of years American policy eventually started to change away [9] from this policy of industrial destruction. The main turning point was the speech "Restatement of Policy on Germany" held in Stuttgart by the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on September 6, 1946.

Reports such as this by former U.S. President Herbert Hoover, dated March 1947, also argued for a change of policy, among other things through speaking frankly of the expected consequences.

{{{1}}}

By 1949, when the Marshall Plan was extended to cover the western half of Germany, the Morgenthau Plan and its effects had started to be deliberately forgotten and suppressed, especially by its former proponents.

Also by 1949 the West Germans had become confident enough to protest against the ongoing Allied policy of reducing German industrial potential through factory dismantling. The Western Allies finally had to halt dismantling in 1950.[10][11]

[edit] Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan

The Plan signed by Roosevelt and Churchill was rather milder than what Morgenthau had devised. In his 'Top Secret' labelled "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III", Morgenthau called for a variety of measures besides the dismantling of infrastructure and a 20 year suppression of industrial activity, such as forced labour and university closures. Germany was to be divided into two separate states: a northern and a southern state. The whole of western Germany, except the south, would have been made into an international zone which would have included areas on the coast of the Baltic Sea and the financially important regions along the Rhine and Ruhr rivers. The Saar was to go to France.

[edit] Notes

[edit] Further reading

• Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945 (2002) ISBN 0-7432-4454-0
• John Dietrich, The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (2002) ISBN 1-892941-90-2

[edit] Primary sources

• Henry Morgenthau, Germany is our Problem. New York 1945

[edit] External links

[edit] Document Collections

• Roosevelt Presidential Library collection relating to Germany (Jan. 1944 - Sept. 1944), (Oct. 1944 - Oct. 1945)
• Marshal Plan Truman Presidential Library scans of documents dated 1946 onwards, most with relevance to the situation in the German zones of occupation.
• European Union online collection of historical documents (requires Flash Player)
• History of German-American Relations U.S. Embassy in Germany, collection.
• Small collection at TeachingAmericanHistory.org, Ashland University.
• United States Department of State Foreign relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944 Contains all documents related to the Second Quebec Conference, including Morgenthau's proposal, various critiques of it, and the approved proposal (the latter located at p. 466).

[edit] Documents

[edit] Images

[edit] Interviews

[edit] Time Magazine articles

[edit] See also

• Marshall Plan
• Monnet Plan
• Bakker-Schut Plan
• Eisenhower and German POWsde:Morgenthau-Plan

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