Neil MacCormick

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sir (Donald) Neil MacCormick QC (Hon), FBA, FRSE, is the current Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the University of Edinburgh, where he also holds a personal Leverhulme Research Professorship. He is a vice-president of the Scottish National Party (SNP), and a renowned legal philosopher.

1 Biography
2 Academia
3 Political career
4 Academic works
5 External links

[edit] Biography

Born May 27, 1941, he is the son of one of the SNP's founders, John MacCormick. He was educated at the University of Glasgow (M.A., 1963, Philosophy and English Lit.), Balliol College, Oxford, (B.A., Jurisprudence), and Edinburgh (LL.D., 1982, by research). MacCormick was knighted in the Queen's Birthday Honours, 2001, in recognition of services to scholarship in Law.

[edit] Academia

MacCormick was a lecturer in Jurisprudence at the University of St Andrews (Queen's College, Dundee) from 1965-67. Following this, he was a fellow and tutor in Jurisprudence, Balliol College, Oxord 1968-1972, and thereafter has held his current position as Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at Edinburgh University. He also held the position of Dean of Law Faculty between 1973-76 and was sometime Vice-Principal for International Affairs.

[edit] Political career

He was a Scottish Member of the European Parliament, for the SNP, elected in 1999, taking a leave of absence from the University of Edinburgh. MacCormick retired from elected office in 2004 to complete his Leverhulme Research Professorship at Edinburgh.

[edit] Academic works

MacCormick has written numerous journal articles and books, concentrating both on Law in a European context and the philosophy of law. Works such as Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (1984), Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978), and Rhetoric and The Rule of Law (2005) all convey his particular brand of political philosophy. Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory answers many of the Dworkinian critiques of the Hartian conception of law, and it is seen by some as showing a middle ground between the two.