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Image:479px-Atomic blast.jpg 14 kiloton atomic explosion, from a 1951 US nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. (Operation Buster-Jangle, Charlie)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Opened for signature	July 1, 1968 in New York
Entered into force	March 5, 1970
Conditions for entry into force	Ratification by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and 40 other signatory states.
Parties	188 [1]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) is an international treaty, opened for signature on July 1 1968 to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. There are 188 sovereign states party to the treaty. However, three (India, Pakistan and North Korea) out of eight confirmed nuclear powers (i.e., those who have openly tested nuclear weapons), and one unconfirmed nuclear power (Israel) are not party to the treaty. Moreover, with the exception of North Korea who withdrew, these states have neither signed nor ratified the treaty in the first place. The treaty was proposed by Ireland, and Finland was the first to sign. In New York City, on May 11, 1995, the parties to the treaty decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.

The treaty is often summarised as having three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. <ref>Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, 26 April 2004, United Nations, New York, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, furnished by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (indonesiamission-ny.org)</ref>

Contents 1 Treaty pillars 1.1 First pillar: non-proliferation 1.2 Second pillar: disarmament 1.3 Third pillar: the right to peacefully use nuclear technology 2 Key Articles 3 History 3.1 United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing 3.2 India, Pakistan, Israel 3.3 North Korea 3.4 Iran 3.5 South Africa 4 Leaving the Treaty 5 Future 6 Parties to the treaty 7 See also 8 References 9 External links

[edit] Treaty pillars

[edit] First pillar: non-proliferation

Five states are permitted by the NPT to own nuclear weapons: France (signed 1992), the People's Republic of China (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by Russia), the United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). These were the only states possessing such weapons at the time the treaty was opened to signature, and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These 5 Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" technology to other states, and non-NWS parties agree not to seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The 5 NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The United States, for instance, has indicated that it may use nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states"^{[citation needed]}. The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states"^{[citation needed]}. In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centers^{[citation needed]}.

[edit] Second pillar: disarmament

Article VI and the preamble indicate that the NWS parties pursue plans to reduce and liquidate their stockpiles; Article VI also calls for "...a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." This formal obligation has never been adhered to by the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states. Many proposals for a complete and universal disarmament tabled at the Conference on Disarmament over the past 3 decades have been rejected under one pretext or the other. The failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states to comply with their disarmament obligations, and the unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT, has left a simmering discontent among many signatories of the NPT, and a justification for the non-signatories to develop their own nuclear arsenals. It is quite probable that many signatories would eventually become disillusioned and seek nuclear weapons of their own, as is seen in the case of North Korea (that pulled out of NPT) and Iran.

In Article I, the Nuclear Weapon States declare not to "induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to ... acquire nuclear weapons." A preemptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties. Iran's ambiguous prevarication with enrichment technology is an indicator of such an induction.

Article X states that any state can withdraw from the treaty if they feel that "extraordinary events", for example a perceived threat, force them to do so. North Korea's withdrawal is a case in point.

[edit] Third pillar: the right to peacefully use nuclear technology

Since very few of the nuclear weapons states and states using nuclear reactions for energy generation are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel, the third pillar of the NPT provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

For some states, this third pillar of the NPT, which allows uranium enrichment for fuel reasons, seems to be a major loophole. However, the treaty gives every state the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station designs use enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be allowed to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Peaceful uranium enrichment can arguably be considered a small step away from developing nuclear warheads, and this can be done by withdrawing from the NPT. No state is known to have successfully constructed a nuclear weapon in secret while subjected to NPT inspection.

Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear regulatory body, has said that if they wanted to, forty countries could develop nuclear bombs.

[edit] Key Articles

Article I:<ref name="NPT">U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (nawcwpns.navy.mil) Treaty On Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</ref> Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices.

Article II: Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.

Article III: Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article VI. The states undertake to negotiate toward general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article X. Establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice. It also establishes the duration of the Treaty (25 years before 1995 Extension Initiative).

[edit] History

See also: Nuclear proliferation

The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognised that the cold war deterrent relationship between just the United States and Soviet Union was fragile. More nuclear players reduced security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accident or unauthorised use, or through the escalation of a small nuclear conflict.

The treaty was proposed by Ireland, and opened for signature in 1968, Finland was the first to sign. By 1992 all five then-declared nuclear powers had signed the treaty, and the treaty was renewed in 1995 (and followed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996). Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, allegedly with the assistance of Israel in the 70s, and may have conducted a nuclear test over the Atlantic in 1979, but has since renounced its nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear arsenal. Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.

[edit] United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret nuclear weapons sharing agreements whereby the United States provided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and stored in, other NATO states. This would appear to be an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the treaty. The NATO states argued internally that the U.S. controlled the weapons in storage, and that no transfer of the weapons or control over them was intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT. These agreements were disclosed to some of the states, including the Soviet Union, negotiating the treaty, but most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time <ref name="is_it_legal">Otfried Nassauer, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (ieer.org), Science for Democratic Action Volume 9 Number 3, May 2001, Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal?</ref>.

As of 2005, it is estimated that the United States still provides between 180 and 480 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under these NATO agreements <ref name="nrdc eur">Hans M. Kristensen, National Resources Defence Council (nrdc.org), February 2006, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning</ref>. EUCOM-officals speak of a stockpile which is "clearly in the ballpark", without giving exact figures. Many states, and the Non-Aligned Movement, now argue this violates Articles I and II of the treaty, and are applying diplomatic pressure to terminate these agreements. They point out that the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and non-U.S. warplanes have been adapted to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs which must have involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information. NATO believes its "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political" <ref>NATO (nato.int), NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment</ref>.

This situation may be unstable. Under NATO convention, in the event of a declaration of war, these nuclear weapons cease to be subject to this treaty. Such a declaration may occur quickly, and in secret; in effect, the NATO nations will become instantaneous overseas bases for deployment and usage of U.S. nuclear weapons. Many would argue that this situation violates the spirit of the treaty, and perhaps even the written rule.

[edit] India, Pakistan, Israel

See also India and WMD, Pakistan and WMD, Israel and WMD

Three states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—have declined to sign the treaty. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it is not known to have conducted tests (see List of countries with nuclear weapons). These countries argue that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.

India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having first done so in 1974 and Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test. India is estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads. Pakistan reportedly has 60. India is one of the few countries to have a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons. According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at its Dimona site in the Negev since 1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like David Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to 200 warheads using the plutonium reprocessed from Dimona.The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after Israeli nuclear expert Mordechai Vanunu—later abducted and jailed by Israel—revealed the program to the British Sunday Times in 1986.

In early March of 2006, India and the United States finalized a deal, having critics in both countries, to provide India with US civilian nuclear technology. Proponents of the deal note that India will now classify 14 of its 22 nuclear facilities as being for civilian use, and thus open to inspection. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the IAEA at the time, welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime". However, attempts made by Pakistan to sign a similar agreement have been thwarted by the U.S. as well as the international community. The argument put forth is that Pakistan lacks the same energy requirements, and that the track record of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear deal in the near future. <ref>BBC (bbc.co.uk), 2 March 2006, US and India seal nuclear accord</ref>

July 2006: United States Congress is poised to approve the US-India Civilian Nuclear Co-operation treaty that was cemented during President Bush's visit to India earlier in the year. The legislation will allow for transfer of civilian nuclear material to India despite its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the basis of its clean proliferation record and that country's voracious appetite for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a billion-plus population.

[edit] North Korea

See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction, Six-party talks

North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal from the treaty on January 10, 2003 following U.S. accusations that it had started an enriched uranium weapons program, and the U.S. stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in 1994 <ref>Korean News Service, Tokyo (kcna.co.jp), 10 January 2003, Statement of DPRK Government on its withdrawal from NPT</ref>. The withdrawal became effective April 10, 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty. <ref>Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (wagingpeace.org), 10 April 2003, North Korea’s Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official</ref> North Korea had once before announced withdrawal, on March 12, 1993, but suspended that notice before it came into effect.<ref>International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea.org), May 2003, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards</ref>

On February 10, 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]," a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issue<ref>Korean News Service, Tokyo (kcna.co.jp), February 2005, DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period</ref>. Six-party talks resumed in July 2005, but recessed on August 7 with no progress. The parties met again the week of August 29.

On September 19, 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord. Under the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply of light water reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program, as per the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussions<ref>Joseph Khan, New York Times (nytimes.com), 19 September 2005, North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts</ref>. On the next day North Korea reiterated its known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT <ref>Agence France Presse, 2006, N.Korea raises stakes on nuclear deal with reactor demand , furnished by Media Corp News (channelnewsasia.com), 20 September 2005</ref>.

On October 2, 2006, the North Korean foreign minister announced that his country was planning to conduct a nuclear test "in the future", although it did not state when. This test was reported to have occurred on 9 October 2006 by state sources.<ref>BBC (news.bbc.co.uk), 3 October 2006, N Korea 'to conduct nuclear test'</ref>.

On Monday, October 9, 2006 at 01:35:27 (UTC) the United States Geological Survey (USGS) detected a magnitude 4.2 earthquake event 70 km (45 miles) North of Kimchaek, North Korea indicating a successful nuclear test. The North Korean government announced shortly afterward that they had completed a successful underground test of a nuclear fission device.

[edit] Iran

Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruction

See also: Nuclear program of Iran

Iran is a signatory state of the NPT and has recently (as of 2006) resumed development of a uranium enrichment program. This enrichment program is a step towards a civilian nuclear energy program, which is allowed under the terms of the NPT. However, the United States and few members of the European Union accuse Iran of using this program to help covertly develop nuclear weapons, in violation of the NPT. Iran remains under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has found unaccounted traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in a nuclear waste facility, though these traces could plausibly be byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities.<ref>EA finds traces of plutonium in Iran</ref> Iran has refused an offer from Russia to provide them with enriched uranium in return for ceasing to enrich their own uranium.<ref>Karl Vick, The Washington Post, 13 March 2006, Iran Rejects Russia's Proposal on Uranium</ref>. There has been some concern, mainly by the US, France, Great Britain and Germany over the possibility of a nuclear armed Iranian state, with general anxieties regarding the goals of Iran's clerical leaders and specific anxieties raised after controversial remarks made by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about the state of Israel<ref>Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Islamic Student Associations conference on The World Without Zionism, 26 October 2005, Text of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Speech, furnished by Nazila Fathi, The New York Times, Tehran bureau (nytimes.com), 30 October 2005</ref>.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. The full text of the fatwa was released in an official statement at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.<ref>Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report (ww4report.com), 12 August 2005, Iran issues anti-nuke fatwa</ref>

[edit] South Africa

South Africa also deserves a special mention as the only country (with a possible exception of Kazakhstan and other ex-Soviet states), that developed nuclear weapons and fully disarmed under the NPT.

During the days of apartheid, the white South African government developed a deep fear of both a black uprising and the threat of communism. This led to the development of a secret nuclear weapons program as an ultimate deterrent. South Africa has a large supply of uranium, which is mined in the country's gold mines. The government built a nuclear research facility at Peledaba near Pretoria where Uranium was enriched to fuel grade for the nuclear power plant at Koeberg as well as weapon grade for bomb production.

In 1991, after international pressure and when a change of government was imminent, South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1993, the then president Frederik Willem de Klerk openly admitted that the country had developed a limited nuclear weapon capability. These weapons were subsequently dismantled prior to accession to the NPT. South Africa then opened itself up to IAEA for inspection. In 1994 the IAEA completed its work and declared that the country had fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.

[edit] Leaving the Treaty

Article X allows a state to leave the treaty if "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country", giving three months' notice. The state is required to give reasons for leaving the NPT in this notice.

NATO states argue that when there is a state of "general war" the treaty no longer applies, effectively the states involved leave the treaty with no notice. This is a necessary argument to support the NATO nuclear weapons sharing policy, but a troubling one for the logic of the treaty. NATO's argument is based on the phrase "the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war" in the treaty preamble, inserted at the behest of U.S. diplomats, arguing that the treaty would at that point have failed to fulfill its function of prohibiting a general war and thus no longer be binding.<ref name="is_it_legal"/> Many states do not accept this argument. See United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing above.

[edit] Future

The inclusion of (civilian) nuclear power in the July 2005 Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate is politically sensitive, as India, which tested its first atomic bomb in 1974, refuses to sign the NPT. Prior to the announcement of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, on 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush had met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and declared that he would work to change US law and international rules to permit trade in US civilian nuclear technology with India. <ref>The Associated Press, 2005, Bush opens energy door to India, furnished by CNN (cnn.com), 18 July 2005</ref> It is feared that in combination with US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian nuclear technology, this would effectively destroy the NPT.<ref>George Monbiot, The Guardian (guardian.co.uk), 2 August 2005, The treaty wreckers</ref>

Every five years, there is a Review Conference on the treaty. At the seventh Review Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the United States, which wanted the conference to focus on proliferation, especially on its allegations against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. The non-aligned countries reiterated their position<ref>Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, United Nations (un.org), New York, 2 May 2005, The General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</ref> that NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement violates the treaty.

[edit] Parties to the treaty

Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan The Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile People's Republic of China Republic of China (Taiwan)1 Colombia Comoros Democratic Republic of the Congo Republic of the Congo Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic East Timor Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon

The Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Holy See (Vatican City) Honduras Hungary Iceland Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Republic of the Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Federated States of Micronesia Moldova Monaco Mongolia Montenegro3 Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger

Nigeria Norway Oman Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia2 Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino São Tomé and Príncipe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia3 Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Vietnam Yemen4 Zambia Zimbabwe

North Korea was a party to the treaty from December 12, 1985 until April 10, 2003.

Notes:

1. The Republic of China (Taiwan) was an original signatory of the NPT, but was effectively expelled from the UN in 1971. Though the UN no longer recognizes the ROC, the ROC states it will continue to abide by the treaty.
2. through the Soviet Union.
3. through Yugoslavia.
4. through the Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

[edit] See also

• Nuclear Free World Policy
• 13 steps (an important section in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty)
• Nuclear proliferation
• Nuclear reactor
• Nuclear war
• List of countries with nuclear weapons
• Nuclear fission
• Nuclear fusion
• Nuclear energy phase-out
• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• Better World Links on the NPT
• Text of the treaty
• Signatories to the treaty
• Abolition 2000 Europe
• Is the NPT still valid or can we find other alternatives?
• NuclearFiles.org Summary and text from the nuclear NPTar:اتفاقية عدم انتشار السلاح النووي

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