Operation Linebacker II
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| Operation Linebacker II | |||||||
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| Part of Vietnam Conflict | |||||||
| Image:B-52c.jpg B-52 over the DRV | |||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||
| United States | Democratic Republic of Vietnam | ||||||
| Vietnam War |
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| Ap Bac – Binh Gia – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Ia Drang – Long Tan – Dak To – Tra Binh Dong –Ong Thanh – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Lang Vei – Hills 881 & 861 – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Ripcord – FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – An Loc – Kontum – Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Ma Thuot – Xuan Loc – 2nd Saigon – Barrell Roll – Rolling Thunder – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Tiger Hound – Lima Site 85 – Tailwind – Chenla II – Cambodia |
Operation Linebacker II was a U.S. Air Force aerial bombing operation conducted during the Vietnam Conflict. It was often referred to as the "Christmas Bombing". The operation was conducted from ? until ? December 1972 saw the heaviest bomber strikes of the Southeast Asain conflict. The campaign was ordered by President Richard M. Nixon against targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Linebacker II was a resumption of the Linebacker bombings conducted from May to October, except that the emphasis of the new campaign shifted to attacks by B-52s rather than tactical fighter aircraft.
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[edit] Preliminaries
A large force of B-52s each carrying 27 or 42 750-pound bombs (depending on their configuration) carried out 11 nights of air strikes against the DRV capital of Hanoi and the port of Haiphong. The North Vietnamese expended most of their surface-to-air (SAM) missile inventory during the defense, damaging ten B-52s and shooting down 15. Privately, the administration knew that politically the bombings could not continue indefinitely; the operation conducted to convince South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu that the U.S. was willing to exert maximum pressure on Hanoi to defend his country once the Paris Peace Accord was signed.
[edit] Planning
In the wake of the Linebacker campaign, the U.S. had available a force of 207 B-52s available for use against the DRV. This deployment to Southeast Asia utilized nearly half of the Air Force's manned bomber fleet. 54 bombers (all B-52Ds) were based at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, while 153 were based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam (55 B-52Ds and 98 B-52Gs). The U-Tapao contingent had suffered the first loss of any B-52 in combat to a SAM in November, and had had two others damaged by missile hits. The crew of the downed B-52 ejected safely and were rescued.
Linebacker II was marked by top-down planning by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters at Omaha, Nebraska. SAC's plan had all B-52s approaching Hanoi in three discrete waves per night, using identical approach paths at the same altitude. The aircraft were to fly in loose three-plane formations known as "cells" for more effective electronic warfare (EW) jamming coverage. Once planes had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC termed "post-target turns" (PTT) to the west. These turns had two unfortunate consequences for the bombers:
- The B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by 100 knots (185 km/h) and prolonging their stay in the target area;
- The PTT would point the emitter antennas for the B-52s' EW systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, degrading the effectiveness of the cells, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the missile guidance radars.
Additionally, the aircraft employed had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer jammers and put out appreciably less power than the B-52Ds. Because of these factors the campaign would be ultimately be conducted in three phases as tactics and plans were altered.
[edit] First Phase
The first three missions were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning on 18 December. On the first night 129 bombers were launched, 87 of them from Guam, and three were lost, two B-52G's from Anderson and a B-52D from U-Tapao, all out of the first wave. 220 SAMs had been fired at the attackers, and only one of the three downed crews could be rescued. On the second night 93 sorties were flown, and although 185 SAMs were fired and a number of bombers damaged, none were lost.
The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems, and limited jamming capability led to the loss of six aircraft on the third night, 20 December, when 99 bombers were sent in. Two B-52Gs and a B-52D were lost by both the first and third waves of the mission, with over 300 SAMs fired. Two of the crews were rescued. The wing commander at U-Tapao sent a message to SAC headquarters sharply criticizing it's tactics and it's control of the operation. As a result, SAC turned planning over to Eighth Air Force headquarters on Guam. The commander of the Eighth, General Johnson, then ensured that the U-Tapao commander, Brigider General Glenn R. Sullivan, who had originally requested the tactical changes, was not mentioned in the official history of the operation.
[edit] Interim Phase
Recognizing that the B-52Gs were vulnerable, SAC scaled down the next four missions to just 30 bombers each, using only D-models, while the overall tactics were reconsidered and additional jammers were installed in the B-52Gs. An immediate change in tactics was made by reducing separation between cells and the between the times each reached the target. Two bombers were shot down the first night of the truncated raids, but subsequent missions saw neither losses nor battle damage. This was followed by a 36-hour pause in the bombing over the Christmas holiday. 124 B-52 missions were also flown against PAVN forces in South Vietnam. 22 crews were transferred from Guam to Thailand to bolster U-Tapao's crew strength.
[edit] Final Phase
On 26 December, the revised tactics came into play: instead of multiple waves, all bombers would be in and out of the Hanoi area within 20 minutes, they would approach Hanoi from multiple directions and at different altitudes, and would exit by varying routes. The steep, post-target turns were also eliminated. Ten targets in both the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were struck, with the bombers approaching in seven streams, four of them off the Gulf of Tonkin. 78 bombers took off from Anderson in one time block, the largest single combat launch in SAC history, while 42 came from Thailand. In addition to the change in tactics, the number of supporting aircraft was also increased to more than 100 per mission, providing chaff drops, escort fighters, Wild Weasel SAM suppression, and Electronic countermeasures support.
The DRV air defense system, though still capable, was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft it had to track in such a short period of time and by a dense blanket of chaff laid down by Seventh Air Force fighter-bombers. Almost 950 SAMs had been fired previously, and the strain on the remaining DRV inventory showed, since only 68 were fired against the mission. Two of U-Tapao's B-52s turned back due to mechanical difficulties, but their cells continued the mission. As a consequence, a B-52 in each cell was lost, including one that crashlanded at it's base, killing most of it's crew.
On the following night, 60 bombers flew the mission, with some attacking SAM sites. One B-52 was destroyed while attacking one of the sites, and a second damaged so heavily that its crew ejected over Laos, where it was rescued. Two further nights of missions were flown, each by 60 bombers, and both were virtually unopposed.
[edit] Summary and Reactions
A total of 741 B-52s were dispatched to bomb the DRV during Linebacker II, with 725 actually completing their missions. 15,000 tons of bombs were dropped on 18 industrial and 14 military targets (including eight SAM sites). 212 other B-52 missions were flown in South Vietnam during the same time period. Ten B-52s were shot down over the DRV, four others crashed in Laos or Thailand, and one crashed at it's base. 26 aircrew members were rescued, 33 were killed or missing, and 33 became prisoners of war. 769 sorties were flown by the Air Force and 505 by the Navy and Marine Corps in support of the bombers. Approximately 700 additional attack sorties were flown by fighters of the Seventh Air Force and 228 by Task Force 77. 12 aircraft were lost (two F-111s, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, an EB-66, an HH-53 rescue helicopter, and an RA-5C), with ten killed, eight captured, and 11 aircrew rescued. Damage to the DRV's infrastructure was severe.
The bombings were protested around the world, as people began to pressure their respective governments to officially condemn them. The United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden did so, but other European countries maintained their silence. Some elements in the Western media were alleged to have misreported the extent of damage done in Hanoi and Haiphong; thus, contributing to anti-war unrest. Civilian casualties were comparatively low, with 1,318 claimed by the DRV government.
President Nixon claimed that the bombings were successful since the North Vietnamese immediately reopened talks in Paris. Hanoi denied that the bombings influenced their decision, because the U.S. agreed to allow PAVN forces to remain in South Vietnam and occupy the territory they had already captured. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 27, 1973, ending U.S. involvement in the conflict.
Other opinions about the effect of the bombings on the government of North Vietnam included:
- A belief that the North Vietnamese were afraid of an even larger air campaign against the DRV's dike system or even the possible use of nuclear weapons.
- A belief that the People's Republic of China would not tolerate either nuclear attacks nor a U.S. ground forces invasion of North Vietnam without entering the war against the U.S. Avoiding an expanded conflict (and a possible escalation to a nuclear exchange) was an important goal of the U.S. government.
After the withdrawal of the U.S. from the conflict, the peace accords between North and South Vietnam ultimately broke down. The North Vietnamese conducted their final offensive, capturing Saigon and ending the war, in 1975.
[edit] U.S. Air Order of Battle
- Task Force 77
- USS America , Carrier Air Wing 8 (F-4, A-6, A-7)
- USS Enterprise , Carrier Air Wing 14 (F-4, A-6, A-7)
- USS Midway , Carrier Air Wing 5 (F-4, A-7)
- USS Oriskany , Carrier Air Wing 19 (F-8, A-7)
- USS Ranger , Carrier Air Wing 2 (F-4, A-6, A-7)
- USS Saratoga , Carrier Air Wing 3 (F-4, -6, A-7)
- Seventh Air Force
- 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4)
- +two squadrons from 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina
- +one squadron from 33rd TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida
- 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (A-7)
- 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (F-4, F-105G)
- 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4, RF-4)
- +two squadrons from 366h TFW after its departure from Danang AB, Vietnam
- 474th Tactical Fighter Wing, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (F-111)
- 43d Strategic Wing, Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52D)
- 72d Strategic Wing (Provisional), Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52G)
- 307th Strategic Wing, U Tapao RTAFB, Thailand (B-52D)
[edit] Notes
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[edit] References
- Drendel, Lou, Air War over Southeast Asia: Vol. 3, 1971-1975. Carrollton TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1984.
- Francillon, René J, Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club US Carrier Operations off Vietnam, (1988) ISBN 0-87021-696-1
- Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
- McCarthy, Brig. Gen. James R. and Allison, Lt. Col. George B., Linebacker II: View from the Rock (Washington, 1979), Air Force Monograph Series
- Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
- Nordeen, Lon, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, (1985) ISBN 1-58834-083-Xit:Operazione Linebacker II
