Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

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The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub.L. 106-274, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. (RLUIPA) is a statute that prohibits the imposition of burdens on the ability of prisoners to worship as they please, as well as making it easier for Churches and other religious institutions to avoid state interference in their property through zoning laws.. It was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 2000, in an effort to correct the constitutionally objectionable problems of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. The act was passed in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate by unanimous consent, meaning that no objection was raised to its passage, so no vote was taken. In the hearings that preceded the passage of the bill, there had only been minor opposition, which came from prison officials who feared that the act would spur frivolous lawsuits.

In the 1990s, the United States Supreme Court had held the RFRA to be unconstitutional, as applied to state and local governments, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Unlike the RFRA, which required religious accommodation in virtually all spheres of life, the RLUIPA only applies to prisoners, and Land Use (Zoning) of properties.

In the 2005 case of Cutter v. Wilkinson, five prisoners in Ohio - including a Wiccan, a Satanist, and a member of a racist Christian sect - successfully sought to apply the protections of the act to their religious practices. The Sixth Circuit had held that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause by impermissibly advancing religion by bestowing benefits to religious prisoners that were unavailable to non-religious prisoners.

The Supreme Court disagreed, unanimously holding that RLUIPA was a permissible accommodation of religion justified by the fact that the government itself had severely burdened the prisoners' religious rights through the act of incarceration. A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas noted that the states could escape the restrictions of RLUIPA simply by refusing federal funds for state prisons.

In Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court had held that a substantial burden on religious exercise was subject to strict scrutiny where the law "lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." That is, where the law allowed different standards to apply in different cases. It was not a case permitting exceptions for freedom of religion when generally applicable health and welfare regulations were in question, and it should be remembered that Smith LOST this case (involving a denial of unemployment benefits where the litigant had used illegal drugs in a religious ceremeony). In short, and in line with the scrutiny regime established in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937, the Court ruled that unless the law is not one of general applicability regardless of specific circumstance, government may act if policy is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, even if the act imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.

In establishing RLUIPA, Congress turned Oregon on its head. RLUIPA imposes strict scrutiny for laws where "the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved." In short, EVERY assessment became individualized, and if in a given case there was a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, strict scrutiny applied.

Could Congress misread the case in this way? Apparently so, because in 2006 the Ninth Circuit, in Guru Nanak v. Sutter County, mechanically applied the law to find in favor of the church, without making (and the County didn't make it either), any remark about Congress basing a law on a Court decision which contradicted the law.

The more important point is whether Congress can roll back West Coast Hotel in this fashion. Apparently so, because the Court itself did so in Lawrence v. Texas (2003).